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Introduction
The research consists of two major topics. The first one is related to reduced-
form credit risk models and in particular identifies an idiosyncratic and a sys-
tematic component in Credit Default Swap returns. The remuneration for the
undiversifiable component is therefore estimated. The second topic consists in a
deep analysis of structural credit risk models, with a specific focus on the reasons
for their failure in the explanation of observed credit spreads, both in levels and
in differences. This issue is tackled from two different perspectives: corporate
bonds and CDS. The following three chapters will be part of the research.
In the first chapter, we study the role of systematic risk in the credit market
and in CDS spreads in particular. The studied variables are the mark-to-market
returns of a protection-seller of CDS contracts on a set of investment grade firms.
A simple linear market model is proposed to describe the returns of the single
CDS contracts using the market index (CDX index) as a systematic factor. The
ability of the systematic factor to price CDS in the cross section dimension is
also assessed. Consequently, the risk premium per unit of systematic risk is
computed and compared to previous studies. Also the evolution through time
of the performance of this simple linear model is investigated, with a specific
focus on the behaviour during the financial crisis. Furthermore, a decomposi-
tion of the risk between systematic and specific is proposed and the changes
in the proportion of the two, both on the entire distribution and on the tails,
is investigated. Finally, a decomposition between specific and systematic risk
is investigated for every different industrial sector. The previous literature dis-
covered a common systematic factor in credit returns (see e.g. Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001) or Berndt and Obreja (2010)). In this work we propose a simple
framework to model this common factor and verify if it is actually priced by the
market.
In the second chapter the most important structural credit risk models are
studied in the framework of a state-space framework. In particular, all the
structural models can be represented in a state space form, where the unob-
served variables are asset values and asset volatilities. Such latent quantities
are measured, possibly with an additional noise, by two observed quantities:
equity prices and volatilities implied in equity options. In general the mea-
surement equations are nonlinear and therefore, in place of a standard Kalman
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filter, some nonlinear filtering techniques are required in order to eliminate the
observational noise. In the work we verify to which extent such sophisticated
filtering approach outperforms simple numerical inversion of measurement equa-
tions, performed under the hypothesis of absence of observational noise.
One of the testable implications of the presence of observational noise con-
taminating the measurement equations is the better performances of the filtering
technique in periods of stress, when liquidity and limits of arbitrage may induce
strong deviations of equity prices and volatilities from the theoretical values
implied by their assets. This difference between the pre- and post-crisis pe-
riod is actually observed and supports the presence of observational noise. The
improvement given by the use of bivariate state space models (based on both
equity prices and volatilities) with respect to a univariate one, already proposed
in the literature, is also investigated.
On the common ground given by bivariate state space models, a comparison
between the performance of the most commonly used structural models is per-
formed. In particular, the ability to explain observed CDS spreads is studied.
The considered models are the simple Merton’s Model, the extension to stochas-
tic interest rates, the endogenization of the default threshold and the inclusion
of a jump component in the stochastic process for the latent asset values. The
improvement given by stochastic interest rates and endogenous default, per se,
is not substantial. Only the introduction of jumps is able to reduce the differ-
ence between predicted and observed spread. Finally, the jump risk premium
implied in credit spreads will be investigated and a decomposition of the default
intensity between a jump and a diffusion-to-default component will be analyzed.
The study enlarges the literature about the empirical testing of structural
credit risk models (such as Jones et al. (1983), Huang and Huang (2003) and
Eom et al. (2004)). Furthermore, we extend the use of the state space framework
for the estimation of structural credit risk models. This idea has been proposed
by Duan and Fulop (2009) in the univariate case and we extend it to the case
of two latent state variables.
The last chapter extends the study of the performances of structural credit
risk models using a large dataset of actual execution prices of more than 4.000
corporate bonds along ten years. The main objective is to verify the role of
market-specific liquidity measures and market-wide indicators of limits of ar-
bitrage in the explanation of the errors made by structural models. The equi-
librium between the market values of assets and all types of liabilities, and
therefore the accuracy of structural models, are guaranteed by non-arbitrage re-
lationships. Therefore, in periods of adverse liquidity conditions and/or strong
limits to arbitrage forces, the performances of structural models are supposed
to deteriorate. We assess the performances of structural models by verifying
the ability of stock and implied volatility returns to explain the changes in
credit spreads. In a second step, we verify the dependence of the errors left by
structural models on the liquidity measures specific to the two markets involved
in the non-arbitrage relationships, i.e. the equity and corporate bond market.
If the performances of structural models were affected by liquidity conditions,
then one would expect higher errors in presence of adverse liquidity conditions.
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The errors of structural models are actually found to significantly depend on
liquidity indicators, and in particular from the liquidity conditions in the credit
rather than in the equity market. Furthermore, if also limits of arbitrage have
a role in the poor performance of structural models, then the residuals left by
both structural variables and liquidity indicators should significantly depend on
market-wide indicators of restriction to arbitrage forces. Also this prediction
is verified since the average errors of structural models are found to depend on
market-wide liquidity indicators such as the TED and LIBOR-OIS spread.
The work relies on the empirical testing literature mentioned in chapter two
and extends it identifying some specific drivers that describe the underperfor-
mance of structural credit risk models.
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Systematic and specific risk in the CDS market
Giovanni Barone-Adesi Matteo Borghi
Abstract
In this paper we study the role of systematic risk in the credit market
and in CDS spreads in particular. We propose a simple linear market
model to describe the returns of the single CDS contracts using the
market index (CDX index) as a factor. In the cross section dimension,
the CDX factor is priced and a significant risk premium of 37 basis
points is estimated and seems to be compatible with previous studies.
However this simple model does not seem to be enough to describe the
entire cross section of realized returns since a significant intercept is
present, especially during the crisis period. We also study the evolution
of systematic risk before and after the financial crisis. Systematic risk
seems to considerably increase during the crisis when measured by
the average R2 of time series regressions, the variance explained by
the first principal components and the increase in the extreme tail
dependence. Finally we propose a simple decomposition of the variance
to separate the systematic and specific component. A strong increase
in the systematic fraction is observed during the crisis. The sector with
the highest systematic fraction of variance, and therefore highest sector
fragility, is the financial one.
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1 Introduction
During the recent financial crisis, we observed a dramatic increase in the
credit spreads quoted on the market. This is true for both the spreads
implicit in the corporate bond market and those paid to buy protection in
the CDS market. This rise in the spreads can be interpreted as an increase
in the risk neutral default probability of the considered companies since such
a dramatic change in the expected recovery rate does not seem plausible.
One first question that arises is therefore whether such high values of the
default probability can be considered systematic or specific and thus diver-
sifiable. Another question concerns the change in the role of systematic
components of credit risk during the crisis period. We investigate such ques-
tions in the CDS market. This choice is justified by the high liquidity of the
credit derivatives market and by the huge volume of outstanding contracts.
According to the ISDA Market Survey of June 2010, the total outstanding
notional covered by CDS contracts amounts to more than 26 trillions in the
first half of 2010. Although this number is huge, it is well below the historical
maximum of outstanding notional, which is equal to more than 62 trillions
in the second half of 2007. Another justification of the choice can also come
from the wider and wider use of indexes of CDS contracts. Here we focus
only on the US market and consider only the CDX as a comprehensive index.
The first contribution of the paper is therefore to propose a model that
separates the systematic and specific components of risk in the CDS market.
The second objective is to analyze in depth the evolution of systematic credit
risk before and during the financial crisis. This is done both on the entire
sample of firms and considering the same data grouped by sector. The change
in risk is investigated also with respect to the “extreme systematic” risk,
measured in terms of extreme tail dependence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly
review the literature on the topic. In section 3 we describe the data we are
using with some of its most important statistical properties. In section 4 we
propose a statistical characterization for the single CDS returns based on a
linear dependence on the returns of the CDX market index. In section 5 we
present the results of the estimated model in the time series and cross-section
dimension, in section 6 we show some tests for the linear model and finally
in section 7 we decompose credit risk into its two components. Section 8
concludes.
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2 Review of the literature
In this paper we rely on several different strands of literature. Since we are
applying a linear model for the characterization of returns, we rely first of all
on the classical asset pricing literature related to the Capital Asset Pricing
Model such as Sharpe [1964], Lintner [1965] and Mossin [1966]. Nevertheless
the classical CAPM literature is based on the equilibrium condition in capital
markets. Given the fact that here we are considering only a relatively
small segment of the entire financial market (the credit market), it seems
inappropriate to invoke such a strong condition. Therefore we are simply
assuming that the returns in the credit market are linearly dependent on the
returns of a (sufficiently diversified) credit market index and that pricing in
this market can be done relying only on the (weaker) non-arbitrage condition.
This statistical characterization is analogous to the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
usually applied to the equity market, whose literature is originated by the
works by Ross [1976] and Roll and Ross [1980].
The second big strand of literature is obviously referred to credit risk. As is
well known, we can identify two big families of credit risk models: structural
and reduced-form. In this paper we are directly modeling credit spreads,
neglecting in this way all the other corporate and market information available
to agents and thus assuming that all the relevant information is efficiently
incorporated into observed credit spreads. Thus the literature we are mainly
referring to is the one of reduced-form models. The first two articles in
this group are Altman [1968] and Beaver [1968]. In both cases, the default
probability is directly modeled through the use of balance-sheet variables.
The first examples of reduced-form models based on market data, instead,
are in Jarrow and Turnbull [1992] and Jarrow and Turnbull [1995]. A more
recent reference for reduced-form models is Duffie and Singleton [1999]. In
all the last three articles the relevant variable is the intensity (Hazard Rate)
of a stochastic process that models the arrival of default events.
A number of articles directly address the modeling of credit spreads
through the use of a set of explanatory variables. Among these,
it is worth mentioning Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin [2001],
Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo [2009] and Berndt and Obreja [2010]. The
first article shows that the variables used in structural models (e.g. implied
volatility or leverage) have a relatively small explanatory power on corpo-
rate bond premia and that a strong systematic factor is still present in the
residual of these regressions. The second article reaches a very different
conclusion, showing that volatility, leverage and risk-free rate explain quite
well CDS spreads and leave no systematic factor in the residuals. However,
this second study is performed on a much shorter time series and CDS
spreads are used in place of corporate bond spreads. Finally, the article
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by Berndt and Obreja [2010] tries to explain the residual common factor
found by Collin-Dufresne et al. [2001] building a “catastrophic factor” as
the difference between the spreads of tranches with different seniority in
CDO products. Such factor actually seems to be strongly significant and to
eliminate the common behaviour in model residuals.
There is also an increasing literature that investigates the presence of
a systematic risk and fragility factors in credit markets. First of all,
Jarrow, Lando, and Yu [2005] theoretically discuss the equivalence between
the risk-neutral and physical measure showing that the two measure are
asymptotically equivalent for “well diversified portfolios”. An exact equiva-
lence is based on stronger utility arguments. Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita
[2007] verify that the correlation between defaults is higher than can be ex-
plained using observable factors. They argue that an economy-wide frailty
factor is present that makes default events more correlated. A similar finding
is presented by Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita [2009]. They show that the
high value of extreme correlation in defaults can be explained introduc-
ing a common unobserved systemic factor. In this case they also estimate
this latent factor as a component in the default intensity process. Finally
Bhansali, Gingrich, and Lonstaff [2008] estimate a model in which the de-
fault intensity is a linear combination of three latent Poisson processes. The
first corresponds to specific default risk, the second to the risk of a sector-wide
default and the third to systemic risk. We also have to consider the literature
on systematic risk which is more closely related to linear models such as
Sharpe [1963].
A strand which is related to these articles is the one that investigates the
presence and the size of a risk premium for undiversifiable credit risk. In
Fama and French [1989] a systematic undiversifiable risk in corporate bonds
is identified, which can be partially explained using macro variables and
indicators of the business cycle in particular. Also Duffee [1999] verifies the
presence of a positive price for credit risk. In this case it is estimated from the
intensity of the arrival of defaults, which is modeled as a square root diffusion
process. The same result is also found by Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann
[2001] and Liu, Longstaff, and Ravit [2002]. In this last case the estimation
of the premium is based on the Interest Rate Swap market, in which a default
risk of the counterparty is implicit.
Other articles define the risk premium as the ratio between risk-neutral and
physical default probabilities. This measure, which is indeed proportional
to the state price per unit probability, can be interpreted as the premium
required by a risk averse agent buying credit risk. This measure is used
among others by Berndt, Douglas, Duffie, Ferguson, and Schranz [2004] and
Driessen [2005]. In the first case an estimation of the physical default
probability is obtained using the Expected Default Frequencies from the
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KMV model, while in the second case the actual default frequencies from
Moody’s and S&P are used. In all the mentioned articles a ratio of roughly 2 is
obtained. Finally it is worth citing the articles by Hull, Predescu, and White
[2005] and Lonstaff, Giesecke, Schaefer, and Strebulaev [2010]. In both cases
the premium is estimated from corporate bond prices and is significantly
different from zero. The only article in contrast with this literature is Dichev
[1998], in which no positive relationship between default risk (measured by
Altman [1968] Z-Score and Ohlson [1980] model) and subsequent returns is
found. Therefore this last work is the only which finds no remuneration for
bearing default risk.
3 Data
3.1 The CDX index
As a proxy for the systematic credit risk, we use the Markit CDX index
Investment Grade with maturity 5 years. This is calculated as the average
of the CDS spreads of the most liquid 125 reference entities. In order to
eliminate the spreads of firms that have been downgraded, for which a credit
event took place and the ones that are not sufficiently liquid any more, the
CDX index rolls its constituents every six months. The continuous series
of CDX spreads provided by Bloomberg do not account for the variation in
the spread simply due to the roll over and only continue the series with the
spread of the new on-the-run series. The series used here, on the other hand,
concatenates the percentage changes of the 15 on-the-run series, removing in
this way the spurious variation only due to the roll over. The source is in
this case Bloomberg.
The time period considered here coincides with the existence of the CDX
index. It begins in October 2003 and ends in September 2010. All the
following analysis is based on a measure of the performance realized by a
potential investor that sells protection in the CDS or CDX market. Such
performance is computed accordingly to the ISDA Standard Model explained
in detail in Appendix and is expressed in percentage of the standard notional
amount of the contract. In general, very similar results are obtained when
the simple first difference of the series is used in place of returns.
The considered period is a very particular one and includes the heavy credit
crisis of 2008-2009. The evolution of the CDX spread is represented in figure
1 together with the evolution of the S&P500 Index.
It’s easy to verify the sharp increase in CDX spread and the corresponding
fall of the stock market starting in August 2007. This close relationship is
confirmed by a negative correlation between the two series of returns equal
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to -45.16% and -60.16% for the daily and two-weeks returns respectively. We
also split the considered time period into two subperiods of equal length,
the first goes from October 29, 2003 to April 13, 2007 and the second from
April 16, 2007 to September 30, 2010. As far as daily changes are concerned,
the correlation increases in absolute value from -0.3494 in the first period to
-0.4615 in the second, as one might expect in periods of crisis.
In table 3.1, we present some descriptive statistics of the daily time series of
the CDX spread in levels.
N Mean St. Deviation Min. Median Max.
CDX Index 1807 102.98 74.21 28.48 60.95 352.60
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
The minimum has been reached in February 2007 and the maximum in
December 2008.
We tested the null hypothesis of unit root of the CDX spread process using
an augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected at
all the standard confidence levels (the ADF t-statistic is -2.34). The CDX
spread process therefore seems to be non-stationary. The same result is
confirmed by the Phillips-Perron and the KPSS test.
If we consider the first difference of the process, the null of unit root is
rejected at any confidence level (the ADF t-statistic is -27.47). We can
conclude that the series is integrated of order 1.
We also investigated the Granger causality relationships between equity
market (here represented by the S&P 500 Index) and the credit market (CDX
Index) using again daily data. The strength of results partially depends on
the number of lags we use in the vector autoregression model. However we
observe in general a strong causality from the equity market to the CDX
market. In particular granger-causality probabilities are virtually zero in
this direction, so that we can always reject the null that Equity market does
not cause (in a Granger sense) Credit market. In the opposite direction the
causality relation depends on the number of lags used but in general it seems
much weaker. For example, the Granger causality probabilities with 5 lags
(one week) are the following.
Variable CDX S&P 500
CDX 0.0000 0.0000
S&P 500 0.0412 0.0003
Table 2: Granger Causality probabilities between CDX and S&P500
We can see that at 5% confidence level we can always reject the null of
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absence of causality in both direction but at 1% level causality is rejected
only from the CDX to the S&P 500 but not in the opposite direction.
We also investigated the cointegration between the time series of the CDX
spread and the S&P500. Both the CDX index and the S&P 500 are inte-
grated of order 1. Since we are considering only two variables, we can test
cointegration by simply implementing the two step Engle-Granger proce-
dure. After estimating a regression on the two variables in levels, we use
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals to verify their stationarity.
The unit root hypothesis in the residuals can never be rejected. Therefore
no strong cointegration relation between the S&P 500 and the CDX spread
is present. The test based on Johansen procedure gives the same result
accepting the null of no cointegration relations. This seems quite reasonable
since we expect the equity index to be much more persistent than the CDX.
The latter, although statistically I(1), from an economic point of view can
show a behaviour closer to stationarity. This fact prevents the existence of a
long-term equilibrium relationship between the levels of the two series.
We also briefly investigate the process of price discovery between stock and
credit market. In the literature, such task is achieved using the measure
introduced in Gonzalo and Granger [1995], and more recently applied by
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh [2005] in the credit spreads context, or by
means of the intervals proposed by Hasbrouck [1995]. Unfortunately in
our case both these procedures are not applicable since the time series of
CDX and S&P500 index are not cointegrated.
Therefore, we simply verify the dependence of contemporaneous returns
of the CDX index on lagged returns of the S&P500 index and vice versa.
We consider only the most significant lags, that is the first two. The two
equations we are estimating are the following
rCDX ,t = b0 +b1rSP,t−1 +b2rSP,t−2 + ε1,t (1)
rSP,t = c0 + c1rCDX ,t−1 + c2rCDX ,t−2 + ε2,t (2)
where rCDX ,t−k and rSP,t−k are the CDX and S&P500 index return respectively,
at the kth lag. The results are the following
Coefficient t-stat
b0 -2.779e-05 -0.5760
b1 0.0396 11.0623
b2 0.0199 5.5442
Table 3: Estimated coefficients of equation (1)
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Coefficient t-stat
c0 3.1801e-05 0.0996
c1 -0.2920 -1.9263
c2 -0.2594 -1.7110
Table 4: Estimated coefficients of equation (2)
We can see that the S&P500 index actually anticipates the CDX index both
at lag 1 and at lag 2. The significance of the first lag is also noticeable. On the
other hand there is no economic significance in the negative coefficients of the
second estimation, in which the ability of CDX index to anticipate S&P500
is assessed. We can conclude that the credit market can be predicted using
information from the equity market while the opposite is not true, at least
in the considered sample. This is also fully consistent with the results about
Granger causality exposed above. A reason for this could be the presence of
more “informed traders” in the equity than in the credit derivatives market,
which induces a delay in the complete incorporation of the information in
credit market prices. Also this result can be interpreted as a lack of efficiency
in the credit market. It is quite surprising to observe such a dependence on
a daily horizon, given that one would expect the information to flow from a
market to another on an intraday horizon. A similar result, but referred to
corporate bonds, is obtained by Kwan [1996], who shows that equity market
actually anticipates the corporate bond market, supporting the hypothesis
that more informed traders are present in the equity market.
A simpler alternative explanation of this finding can come from the presence
of stale quotes in the CDS contracts underlying the CDX index which
automatically induces correlation between the CDX index and lagged equity
returns.
According to standard structural models (such as Merton [1974]) another
determinant beyond equity value affects the default event: volatility. In
figure 2 we represent the evolution of the VIX and CDX Index. The common
trend is evident and it is also confirmed by the correlation between the two
series, which is equal to 39.41% for daily changes and 56.48% for two-weeks
changes. Also in this case, the correlation in the second subperiod (40.39%)
is higher than in the first (33.37%).
We also compared the behaviour of the CDX index and traditional bond
indexes. In particular we built an artificial index as the difference between
daily returns in the Citigroup GBI Corporate BBB 1-5 Years and the Citi-
group GBI Treasury 1-5 Years. The daily returns of the resulting index have
a correlation equal to 62.51% with the CDX Index. This indicates that the
spreads on the bond and credit derivative market are highly but not perfectly
correlated. Of course, in this case, the imperfect correlation can also come
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from different maturity (5 years Vs. 1-5 years) and rating.
Finally, we consider the returns of the CDX index at 1-day frequencies. For
the computation of such returns refer to section A. The first interesting
result, as already documented in Bystrom [2008] for the Itraxx indexes, is
the presence of a strong autocorrelation (13.91%) in the first differences of
the daily CDX spreads. The same result (13.7%) is obtained when we use
the daily mark-to-market returns of the market value of a CDX contract
expressed as a percentage of the notional. Some autocorrelation (3.21% and
3.06% for the first differences and the mark-to-market percentage variations
respectively) is present also at the second lag.
We verify this by estimating the following simple AR(2) model
∆CDXt = a0 +a1∆CDXt−1 +a2∆CDXt−2 + εt (3)
and we get the coefficients in table 5.
Coefficient t-stat
a0 0.0512 0.4563
a1 0.1373 5.8285
a2 0.0130 0.5502
Table 5: Estimated coefficients of equation (3)
The results are very similar when we use the percentage mark-to-market
returns in place of the simple first difference. The regression coefficient is
still strongly significant.
We also evaluated the evolution in time of such autocorrelation. In partic-
ular, we evaluate it in the two subperiods defined above. The first order
autocorrelation is significantly higher in the first period (21.69%) than in the
second (13.56%). Similar results are derived from the estimation of equation
(3). In particular
10/2003-7/2007 7/2007-9/2010
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
a0 -0.0170 -0.5615 0.1223 0.5491
a1 0.2169 6.5041 0.1356 4.0631
a2 0.0276 0.8271 0.0123 0.3692
Table 6: Estimated coefficients of equation (3)
In both periods the lagged difference is statistically significant but the
coefficient and its significance is reduced in the second period.
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Also in this case, this apparent inefficiency can be justified by the presence
of stale quotes in the CDX index and in particular in the early stages of its
life, since this phenomenon is vanishing as the volume of transactions and
the number of agents in the market is increasing.
Of course this analysis is based on quoted mid prices and does not consider
the presence of bid-ask spreads and the costs required to implement an
arbitrage strategy between the index and the single CDS.
The most important descriptive statistics of the time series of daily CDX
returns are summarized in the following table.
N Ann. St. Dev. Skew. Kurt. Min. Max.
CDX Index 1806 3.33% -0.7024 22.51 -2.15% 1.55%
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for the CDX Index
It’s important to notice the strong negative value of the skewness, especially
if compared with the skewness of the S&P500 index in the same period,
which is -0.2622, and the extremely high level of kurtosis. The distribution of
CDX returns is very far from normality and the Jarque-Bera null hypothesis
of normality is strongly rejected (with a p-value of less than 0.001).
If we extend the horizon and consider the 15-days differences and returns
the presence of autocorrelation completely disappears. Only a negative
autocorrelation of about 2% is present for the first and second lag. The
estimation of equation ((3)) for 15-days differences and mark-to-market
variations gives in this case totally insignificant coefficients (not reported).
The entire autocorrelation function of daily returns is represented in figure 3
and shows a strongly significant coefficient at the first lag.
If we move to the autocorrelation function of squared returns, we can deduce
the clear presence of strong persistence in variance (see figure 4). So, in
analogy to the equity market, we can hypothesize the presence of a GARCH
structure also in the returns from credit default swap market. There are no
dramatic differences between the particular specifications of the GARCH
model. We explored the use of different specifications such as the EGARCH
and the Glosten-Jagannathan-Runkle (GJR), and different distributions for
the innovations such as Normal and Student’s t, but the improvement in
the fit of the data is not decisive. Also concerning the choice of ARCH and
GARCH parameters the simplest choice of p = q = 1 seems to be enough.
Therefore, in figure 5 we present the autocorrelation function of the filtered
residuals of a parsimonious GARCH(1,1) model. Much of the structure of
the returns is removed and residuals are quite close to serial uncorrelation.
Unfortunately, this procedure doesn’t have a particular impact on the normal-
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ity of returns. In fact the values of skewness and kurtosis are not significantly
modified with respect to the non-filtered series and the Jarque-Bera hy-
pothesis of normality is still strongly rejected (with a p-value still less than
0.001).
3.2 A Markov Switching model
We have already mentioned the apparent presence of two clearly separated
time periods in the considered interval. In particular, the first “State of
the World” ends at the beginning of the sub-prime crisis in the summer of
2007 while the second goes from the beginning of the crisis to the end of the
period. We consider such a separation several times in the paper. We now
investigate the statistical reliability of our choice. In order to do so, we fit a
two-state Markov switching model on the time series of returns for the CDX
index.
We can clearly fit a two states model and observe a neat break between state
1 and 2 in the summer of 2007. The first of the two states is characterized by
credit returns with a slightly higher mean and a much smaller variance. The
graph of the time series of the (smoothed) probabilities of being in state 1 or
2 is presented in figure 6. We observe the apparent change of state during
the summer of 2007 and a smaller switch to the “bad” state around May
2005. We can identify this episode with the automotive sector crisis, and in
particular with the downgrade of GM bonds from investment grade to junk,
which had an impact on the entire credit market.
This finding confirms the presence of a Markov switching model in the credit
market already investigated by Alexander and Kaeck [2008] for the iTraxx
index in the European market.
3.3 Single CDS contracts
The CDS spreads used here are relative to 5-years contracts on 238 reference
entities. These companies are selected from the population of the S&P500
based on the liquidity of the quoted CDS spreads. All the spreads used are
quoted and not transaction spreads and the source is Thompson Datastream.
In figure 7 we represent the rating distribution of the sample as provided by
S&P and observed at the end of the period.
The median rating is BBB+. One has to consider that these ratings are
observed after the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. Consequently, they are
arguably lower than the ratings of the same companies at the beginning of
the period.
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The distribution by GICS sector of the companies is the following
GICS Sector N
Materials 21
Industrials 34
Consumer Discretionary 42
Telecommunication 10
Energy 23
Consumer Staples 25
Financials 31
Utilities 19
Information Technology 12
Health Care 21
Table 8: Sector distribution of the analyzed companies
The average spread of the 238 CDS on the considered period is 108.46 bps,
which is very similar to the average of the CDX index spread (102.98).
Therefore the set of companies used here seems to have a level of risk indeed
similar to the CDX Investment Grade index. As said before, the liquidity of
single CDS contracts is smaller than that of the CDX index. We therefore
avoid the use of daily data and concentrate only on 2-weeks differences and
returns, removing in this way all the high-frequency noise coming from stale
quotes.
The average pairwise correlation between the 238 CDS is equal to 0.43, which
is quite a large number, especially when compared to the average correlation
between the equity returns of the same 238 companies, which is 0.34. So the
analysis of the systematic components for the panel of CDS returns seems
particularly important.
We also implemented a simple principal component analysis on the panel of
two-weeks returns for the 238 companies. The first component explains the
35.76% of the total variance and the second the 13.38%. It is also interesting
to notice that the first principal component has a correlation equal to 78.14%
with the CDX Index. This indicates that the first principal component
captures quite accurately systematic credit risk and, at the same time, that
the choice of the CDX index as a proxy for market credit risk seems suitable.
4 A linear Model
We propose a statistical characterization of the returns of every single Credit
Default Swap based on a simple linear model. In particular, the return of a
single CDS is assumed to be
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ri,t = E (ri,t)+βi (rCDX ,t −E (rCDX ,t))+ εi,t (4)
where
• ri,t is the change in mark-to-market value of the position of a protection
seller on the ith CDS, expressed as a percentage of the notional
• rCDX ,t is the change in mark-to-market value of the position of a pro-
tection seller on the CDX North America Investment Grade index,
expressed as a percentage of the notional
• βi is the sensitivity of the ith CDS to the CDX index
• E(·) indicates the expectation under the risk neutral measure
• εi,t is an idiosyncratic component, specific to asset i. It is assumed to
be independent of the variable rCDX ,t and such that E(εi,t · ε j,t) = 0 for
i 6= j.
As said above, the spread of a new CDS contract is chosen in such a way
that the expected return under the risk neutral measure is equal to zero for
both parties. Therefore all the risk neutral expectations in (4) are zero for
every CDS and for the CDX index.
Thus equation (4) reduces to
ri,t = βirCDX ,t + εi,t (5)
If a sufficiently large number of CDS is present on the market, we can argue
that a portfolio can be constructed in such a way that all the idiosyncratic
components are diversified away. The perfect diversification can be obtained
only asymptotically, in presence of an infinite number of contracts.
If this condition is verified, we can invoke the Arbitrage Pricing Theorem
(Harrison and Pliska [1981]) or simply take the physical expectation of equa-
tion (5) to find, under absence of asymptotic arbitrage opportunities, the
following pricing relation.
EP (ri,t) = EP (rCDX ,t)βi +ηi (6)
where EP (·) indicates the expectation computed under the physical measure.
This is the theoretical pricing equation for any CDS on the market. Notice
that in this relationship no intercept is present. The reason is again that,
under the risk neutral measure, the expected return of a position in a CDS
is zero and not the risk-free interest rate. This is in strict analogy to what
happens in futures markets.
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4.1 Testable Equations
In order to estimate the model, we need the empirical counterparties of
equations (5) and (6).
The first can be estimated in the time series dimension using the following
regression
ri,t = αi +βirCDX ,t + εi,t (7)
The model predicts that all the intercepts αi are zero for every CDS i.
The second equation has to be tested in the cross sectional dimension using
the following regression
ri,t = γ+λβi +ηi (8)
where
• ri,t is the time average of the mark to market performance in the
considered period
• βi is the coefficient estimated in equation (7) for the ith CDS.
In this case the model predicts the intercept γ to be zero and the slope λ to
be significantly positive.
4.2 Measurement Error
In the considered framework, two econometric issues are present. The stan-
dard errors and the t-statistics of the estimated coefficients are incorrect, given
the possible presence of heteroskedasticity and cross correlation in the residu-
als of regression (8). Furthermore, as observed by Black, Jensen, and Scholes
[1972], the coefficients β used in equation (8) are not directly observable and
may change over time. This induces a measurement error which causes bias
and inconsistency in the coefficients γ and λ estimated above.
In the same article, the authors also suggest a simple procedure to overcome
the problem of measurement error: the grouping of single return series into
portfolios. This procedure should also reduce the effects of time-varying
betas. The grouping should ideally be based on a variable that is correlated
with the coefficients β but measured independently from them. Due to the
relatively short time series it seems impossible to use values of the betas
estimated on previous non-overlapping periods, as often proposed in the
literature.
21
Coefficient t-stat
a0 -0.2298 -2.3877
a1 0.7202 10.9570
a2 0.8607 3.7898
Table 9: Estimated parameters of equation (9)
Standard structural models of credit risk, such as Merton [1974], postulate
the presence of a one-to-one relationship between debt and equity. We there-
fore propose to construct the groups using the equity betas as instrumental
variables. We compute, for every CDS reference entity, the regression coeffi-
cients of equity returns on the returns of the market index S&P500 in the
same period. These quantities are certainly measured independently from
“credit” betas and so the only thing we have to verify in order to justify their
use as instruments is the presence of correlation with equity betas. It turns
out that the cross section correlation between credit and equity β is equal to
57.8% for the single CDS and 89.29% for grouped data.
We go slightly more in depth considering that, according to Merton model,
the relationship between debt and equity volatility also depends on the
leverage of the firm. Thus, we want to confirm the validity of equity beta as
an instrument for credit beta estimating the following regression.
β= a0 +a1βEquity +a2Leverage+ ε (9)
The estimated coefficients are in table (9).
As expected, both equity beta and leverage seem to be significant. This
is true also jointly, since the p-value of the F statistic is negligible. The
cross-section R2 is in this last regression equal to 37.25% and the null of zero
cross-correlation of residuals is strongly accepted.
Therefore the 238 companies are sorted on the basis of their equity beta and
then grouped into 30 equally weighted portfolios.
We tackle the other econometric issue, the incorrect t-statistics, by correcting
the standard error of the estimated coefficients (and consequently the t-
statistic) with the Eicher-White method.
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5 Estimation and Results
5.1 Time series estimation
5.1.1 Single CDS
We first estimated equation (7) separately for every CDS without grouping
into portfolios.
The intercept α is not univocally significant along the sample, while the slope
β is always significant. In order to give an aggregate representation of the
significance of the coefficients α and β, we have to compute an aggregate
point estimate and an aggregate t-statistic. The point estimate, presented in
the following table, is obtained by simply averaging the coefficients of the
238 single regressions. The t-statistic is obtained dividing the point estimate
by the cross-section standard deviation of the vector of estimated coefficients.
The same method is used in Collin-Dufresne et al. [2001].
The estimated coefficients are
Coefficient t-stat
α 1.37e-04 4.3714
β 0.8009 17.2933
Both coefficients are strongly significant. The significance of the intercept
can be interpreted against the validity of this simple linear model. It seems
reasonable that such a simple specification is not able to capture all the
structure present in the panel of CDS data and that the neglected information
(missing variables or non-linearities) is included into the constant. On the
other hand, the strong significance of the intercept, supports the dependence
of each CDS, in the time series dimension, on a ‘credit market factor’, here
proxied by the CDX index.
The R2s of the 238 regressions in (7) are distributed between 3.03% and
57.87% with an average of 32.56% (see figure 8). The F statistic is significant
at a 5% level for all the 238 regressions and only in 3 cases it is not significant
at the 1% level.
We also estimated regression (7) as a pooled regression. The point estimates
are not different from the ones presented above while the t-statistics are
changing. In particular, the significance of the intercept is reduced, although
it remains strong, and the significance of the slope is considerably amplified.
We have in particular
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Coefficient t-stat
α 1.37e-04 2.1759
β 0.8009 80.023
As already said, the model is very simple and it appears natural that some
autocorrelation is still present in the residuals. In particular, according to the
Durbin-Watson test, the autocorrelation is statistically zero only for 71.0%
of the examined residual series at a 95% confidence level. The F-statistics
computed on the single regressions confirm the significance of the regression
since none of the p-values of the test is larger than 5%. Residuals still present
strong characteristics of non-normality (the average kurtosis in the residuals
is 16.68 and the average skewness -0.52).
In analogy with the panel of CDS returns, we also implemented a principal
component analysis on the panel of the residuals from the simple linear
regressions described above. The first component explains the 21.86% of the
total variance and the second the 6.20%. This is significantly less than the
results obtained on the panel of returns (35.76% and 13.38%, respectively).
This means that the model is able to eliminate a considerable fraction of the
systematic risk. Of course, all the principal components are now orthogonal
to the returns on the CDX index.
The relatively short time series seem to make the estimation of time-varying
coefficients very unreliable. We therefore repeat the procedure described
above on the two periods considered above and justified by the estimation
of the Markov Switching model in section 3. The results of the time-series
estimations on the two subperiods are presented in the following table
10/2003-7/2007 7/2007-9/2010
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
α 3.52e-05 1.6076 2.19e-04 3.5388
β 0.9628 10.4774 0.7965 17.0526
If we use the pooled regression technique, we obtain larger t-statistics for
the slope coefficients and slightly smaller for the intercepts but, as above,
the results of the significance tests are not modified. The average R2 is equal
to 22.68% in the first period and 34.95% in the second.
If we consider the principal components of the residuals on the two subperiods
separately we still observe a reduction in the variance explained by the first
principal component with respect to the case of the returns. In the first
subperiod the first principal component goes from 36.67% for the returns
to 10.70% for the residuals. In the second subperiod the first principal
component goes from 36.96% for the returns to 24.32% for the residuals. In
both periods the systematic structure left in the residuals is less than in the
24
original returns, but the effectiveness is much higher in the first period. This
simple linear model is probably not able to effectively take into consideration
all the sources of systematic risk in the crisis period.
5.1.2 Grouped data
All the results presented in the previous section are based on single CDS
time series. The presence of measurement error already described in section
4 suggests the use of portfolios of CDS instead of single contracts. This
will be particularly relevant for the cross-section analysis presented in next
section. Nevertheless, we also present some time-series evidences based on 30
portfolios created according to the Beta measured in the equity market. This
guarantees the independence of measurement from the credit beta preserving
the correlation between the two, as verified above.
The results at time series level and obtained with the same procedure de-
scribed in the previous section are reported in the following table.
Coefficient t-stat
α 1.31e-04 3.2253
β 0.8088 7.6510
The point estimates are very close to the case of ungrouped data, while we
observe a decrease in the t-statistic of the slope, although it remains strongly
significant. The average R2 of the 30 regressions on grouped data is 56.09%.
The F statistics is always significant at the 5% and 1% level. Also in this
case, according to Durbin-Watson test, the autocorrelation in residuals is
statistically zero for only 23 portfolios out of 30 (76.67%).
If we repeat the analysis on the two sub-periods we get
10/2003-7/2007 7/2007-9/2010
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
α 2.31e-05 1.0066 2.23e-04 2.7515
β 0.9544 9.6376 0.8051 7.5193
Also in this case, we observe estimates very similar to those based on un-
grouped data, apart from the t-statistic of slope in the second subperiod,
which is lower. The average R2 increases from 52.83% in the first period to
57.22% in the second.
Both on the entire sample and on the two subsamples we ran pooled regres-
sions. The results confirm the tendency observed in ungrouped data: the
significance of the intercept is decreased while the significance of the slope
strongly increases. The point estimates are still not distinguishable.
25
5.2 Cross section estimation
The next step in the estimation of the model is the assessment of the
relationship between the exposure to systematic credit risk (β) and the
remuneration for bearing such a risk. As a consequence of the already
mentioned error in measurement of the βs, we estimate the cross section
equation (8) only for the 30 portfolios of CDS created according to the equity
beta.
One first issue one has to care about is if the coefficients β present a sufficient
degree of dispersion across assets to make the cross section estimation reliable.
Our sample seems to present a satisfying dispersion of betas, as testified by
the histogram in figure 9.
In figure 10 we also represent the scatter plot of the average quoted spread
during the considered period versus the β estimated from equation (7). We
present the dispersion for both the single CDS and the 30 portfolios. The
relationship is strongly positive. This means that the protection against
default for companies with a bigger (linear) exposition to systematic credit
risk is more expensive. Nevertheless, we cannot directly interpret the CDS
spread as a risk premium and therefore we cannot conclude that the a
premium for bearing systematic risk exists and is positive.
Indeed, in a world in which agents are risk neutral the CDS spread is just
the compensation for the expected loss, where the expectation is computed
using the risk-neutral default probabilities. In the real world, agents may use
physical default probabilities (in general lower than risk neutral ones) and
include a risk premium in the spread they require for bearing default risk or
equivalently for unexpected loss, which is neglected by risk neutral agents.
In general we don’t know the degree of risk aversion of the agents in the
market and therefore from the presented dependence we can only conclude
that companies with higher systematic credit risk have a higher risk-neutral
expected loss or are characterized by a higher compensation for unexpected
loss.
We then move to consider realized returns rather than spreads, and in
particular we examine the cross section relationship expressed in equation
(8). Graphically, we observe in figure 11 the presence of a positive relationship
between systematic risk (β) and returns realized in the period. Nevertheless
datapoints seem quite dispersed around the fitted line and the relationship
appears quite weak.
The estimated coefficients are the following
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Coefficient t-stat
γ -0.1847e-03 -4.3801
λ 0.1430e-03 2.4643
Also the F statistic is very high and its p-value is less than 1%. The cross-
section R2 on the 30 groups is equal to 36.32%. The coefficients in the
regression are referred to two-weeks returns. If we annualize them, we get
an intercept equal to -48 bps and a slope equal to 37 bps. We can interpret
the slope as a risk premium paid to the bearer of systematic credit risk per
unit of beta. This premium is only the remuneration for the unexpected loss
that a risk averse agent requires.
We can compare our estimate with the results in some of the articles men-
tioned in section 2. Liu et al. [2002] estimated a premium equal to 45 basis
points per year. However, their estimate is based on the spread between
Interest Rate Swaps and Treasury rates at a 10 years maturity. So they
consider a longer horizon and only firms in the financial sector. Hull et al.
[2005] estimate a premium of 66 basis point for investment grade bonds but
all the maturities they are considering are greater than 6 years. Finally a
work by Lonstaff et al. [2010] proposes a risk premium equal to about 80
basis points, which is more than twice our estimation. However, this last
study is based on secular bond data (almost 150 years). Consequently, we
argue that their sample is quite different from ours. For instance, the vast
majority of listed companies at the beginning of their sample, and before
the crisis of the 1870s, was in the railroad sector while today such sector is
almost completely absent from the benchmark indexes.
The estimation of the premia on the CDS rather than on the corporate bonds
market arises questions about the presence of a remuneration for the default
risk of the counterparty and not only of the reference entity. In this case we
can rely on the work by Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff [2011] in which the
presence of a counterparty premium is proved to be statistically significant
but almost negligible from the economic point of view. According to the
article, both the statistical significance and the economic magnitude increase
after the Lehman collapse but they still remain quite small. The reason
for this may be the presence of margin requirements and collateralization
conventions usually adopted in the market, which should strongly reduce
counterparty risk. The presence of a risk premium automatically shows
that the theoretical “sufficient diversification” condition given in Jarrow et al.
[2005] is actually not verified in the market.
The presence of a credit risk premium can also be justified by the results in
section 3, where a considerable correlation between equity and credit market
is shown. This fact reduces the diversification opportunities for the investors,
who consequently require a premium for investing in the credit market.
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In conclusion, the presence of a positive risk premium seems to be justified and
its numerical estimation seems quite reasonable compared to other studies,
especially when we consider that our estimation period is characterized by
the presence of the financial crisis, which lowers the realized returns and
therefore the realized risk premia.
5.2.1 A comparison with the Equity Premium
In order to have an idea of the reliability of the estimated premium, we apply
the method just described to the computation of the equity risk premium
for the same sample of companies in the same period.
In order to reduce the effects produced by the above mentioned measurement
error in betas, we use again the grouping approach based on 30 portfolios.
We still need an instrumental variable that is correlated to the equity beta
but measured independently on it. In analogy with the previous paragraphs,
we use the credit beta as instrumental variable and form the portfolios based
on it.
The results of the time series estimation are presented in the following table.
As before, the point estimate is the average of the single estimations and the
t-statistic is based on the cross-sectional standard deviation of the estimated
betas.
Coefficient t-stat
α 0.0026 11.7843
β 1.1874 8.7234
The average R2 of the 30 portfolios is in this case 71.79%. The F statistics is
always strongly significant.
When we consider the cross section relationship of equation (8), we estimate
the following coefficients
Coefficient t-stat
γ 0.0024 5.5992
λ 0.0011 2.8957
Both the coefficients are significant. The cross-section R2 on the 30 groups
is equal to 24.46%. If we annualize the estimated coefficients, we get an
estimated equity risk premium equal to 2.45% per year.
We can derive some conclusions from the comparison between the credit and
equity linear model. First, the fraction of cross-sectional variance explained
by the model is greater in the credit model case, where the R2 is more than
36%. This may indicate that the use of the systematic returns as unique risk
factor is more appropriate in the credit market than in the equity market or,
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equivalently, that the impact of the idiosyncratic component is less important
in the credit market, more dependent on systematic factors.
Second, in both cases a significant cross-section intercept is present. This
means that the simple linear model is not able to capture the total cross-
sectional variability in a complete way. It seems reasonable to conclude that
the linear specification is not appropriate or that some other explanatory
variable is missing.
Third, we observe that the relatively small credit risk premium comes with
a relatively small risk premium on the equity market, at least if compared
to other standard studies such as Mehra and Prescott [1985]. This may be
a consequence of the sample of firms or of the time period in which the
estimations are performed.
6 Some tests of the model
There are many ways to test a model like the proposed one. Here we present
some simple tests in the cross-sectional dimension. The main purpose is to
verify if systematic credit risk is actually priced and if it is able to explain
the cross section of CDS returns.
In particular, if we consider equation (6), the model predicts an intercept γ
statistically equal to zero and a generally positive coefficient λ. The estima-
tions for the intercept γ and the coefficient λ, respectively, are presented in
the following two tables. Results are referred to grouped data and annualized.
γ Coefficient t-stat
10/2003-7/2007 -0.0006 -0.3306
7/2007-9/2010 -0.0097 -7.9230
10/2003-9/2010 -0.0048 -4.3801
λ Coefficient t-stat
10/2003-7/2007 0.0039 1.7706
7/2007-9/2010 0.0036 2.7594
10/2003-9/2010 0.0037 2.4643
The CDX factor is priced on the entire sample at standard confidence levels.
On the pre-crisis period the relationship appears weaker and the factor is
priced only at the 90% level, while in the second sub-period the t-statistic is
2.76.
On the other hand, the estimated intercept seems to be insignificant in the
pre-crisis period but becomes significantly negative during the crisis and on
the entire sample. This means that during periods of stress the model seems
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to be too simple and some of the unexplained information is captured by
the constant. It is possible that the impact of systematic risk becomes less
elementary in those periods, involving non-linear relationships or stronger
extreme connections.
6.1 Impact of other factors
We want to verify if the estimated premium actually comes from the remu-
neration of systematic non-diversified credit risk or from other sources of risk.
One possibility we can probably exclude is liquidity risk. CDS are synthetic
instruments, available in theoretically unlimited quantities, which eliminates
the exposure to liquidity conditions. Nevertheless we tried to verify the
role of some liquidity factor. One issue here is that many commonly used
liquidity factors are both liquidity and credit factors. For instance spreads
such as the TED or the Libor-OIS spread cannot be considered as pure
liquidity indicators. In fact, they incorporate a reward for the credit risk of
the financial intermediaries that are operating on the Libor market, which
are not risk-free and whose default probability significantly increased during
the crisis. In this way the proxy for liquidity risk would include also some
components of credit risk, and would reduce the orthogonality between the
two risks. On the other hand, an indicator like Pastor-Stambaugh seems
difficult to compute on frequencies higher than one month, as in our case.
This is because these indicators are in essence regression coefficients, whose
estimation on 10 working days only appears unreliable.
We used therefore two bid-ask spreads: the bid-ask of the 30-year on-the-run
T-Bond and the bid-ask spread of the 3 months Eurodollar future rate. These
quantities can be considered as indicators of the liquidity in the fixed-income
market at short and long maturities and do not include any considerable
counterparty risk. It turns out that they are both insignificant and not priced
and their effect on the estimated premium is in general negligible.
We also add other factors to the statistic characterization of credit returns
proposed in equation (4). We added an indicator of economic cycle and other
indicators of interest rate conditions. In particular, we take the slope of the
term structure of interest rates (10-2 years spread) as indicator of business
cycle and the observed zero interest rates at different maturities.
Thus the additional regressors included are
• the changes in the bid-ask spread of the US Eurodollar deposits with
maturity 3 months
• the changes in the bid-ask spread of the on-the-run US 30-year T-bond
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• the changes in interest rates at all the maturities from 3 months to 10
years
• the change of the difference between 10 and 2 years interest rates
(Slope)
• the returns of a broad BBB bond index
We therefore consider the regression
ri,t = αi +β1,irCDX ,t +β2,iXt + εi,t (10)
where Xt is the generic additional factor used.
As before, we first estimate the time-series regressions for the 30 groups and
then the cross-section one including the CDX index and each of the mentioned
regressors separately. The increase in the R2 for grouped data is only marginal
(1-2% on average). The regressors that give the best improvement are long-
term interest rate, liquidity indicators and the BBB bond index, although
the increase is always less than 5%.
We then look at the significance of the cross-section coefficient estimating
the following equation.
ri,t = γ+λ1β1,i +λ2β2,i +ηi (11)
We observe that the new factors are in general not significantly priced. In
particular, liquidity factors are statistically insignificant in the cross-section
dimension. A strong exception is the BBB bond index, which seems to be
statistically priced. This is probably due to the high correlation between
the BBB and the CDX index already mentioned above. Another priced
factor seems to be the change in the slope of the term structure, but all
the considered variables do not significantly affect the cross-section slope
coefficients estimated for the CDX index which remains close to 40 bps.
Also in this case, the only exception is the BBB bond index, for which a
collinearity issue may be present.
The detail of the cross-section regressions are presented in the following table
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Additional Factor λ2 t-stat λ1 t-stat
Eurodollar Bid-Ask 0.0093 0.8967 0.0045 3.8618
T-Bond Bid-Ask -6.005e-5 -0.0969 0.0037 3.8857
Slope 0.0027 3.7350 0.0041 5.2164
6 months zero rate 0.0018 1.2605 0.0045 3.7563
12 months zero rate 0.0019 1.2228 0.0044 3.9023
10 years zero rate -0.0035 -1.7953 0.0040 4.4372
BBB Index returns 0.0171 5.7769 -0.0080 -3.2192
All the t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity in the residuals ac-
cording to the Eicher-White method.
7 Systematic risk
One of the goals of this work is to disentangle the systematic component of
credit risk from the specific one. There are many possibilities to measure
systematic credit risk. The first and most obvious one is just given by the
average R2 of equation (4) across single assets or portfolios. Of course, when
the systematic component of risk is high the ability of the market index to
explain (on average) the variability of the single CDS will be greater. This
means that the behaviour of single credit spreads are strongly driven by
common factors and therefore that systematic risk is high.
In the period considered here, we observe an increase of the average R2 of
regression (4) for single CDS and grouped data. We split the time period
into two as in the previous section and verify that the average R2 increases
from 52.83% in the first period to 57.22% in the second.
Another indication of the increase in systematic risk comes from the principal
component analysis of the panel of mark to market variations and residuals
from equation (7). As far as returns are concerned, the fraction explained by
the first principal component increases from 68.7% in the first period to 78%
in the second. If we consider residuals, the increase is more dramatic. The
weight of the first component is only 30.12% in the first period and it climbs
to 54.73% in the second period. Similar results are obtained if we consider
the sum of the first 2 or 3 principal components.
From the first result we can conclude, as before, that the systematic credit
risk has increased in the second period. On the other hand, from the second
result we conclude that the component of the variance unexplained by the
model increases. This means that the simple linear model considered here
is able to capture the systematic component of risk in the first non-crisis
period but it fails in the second. During the crisis, a considerable portion of
the variance remains unexplained by this simple linear model. The presence
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of structure in the residuals is also confirmed by the big difference between
the weight of the first principal component with respect to the second and
the following ones, which does not happen in the first subperiod.
7.1 Variance decomposition
If we observe equation (5) and given the independence properties of ε, we
have that
V (ri,t) = β2iV (rCDX ,t)+V (εi,t) (12)
where V (·) indicates the variance operator. The quantity β2iV (rCDX ,t) can be
interpreted as the systematic component of the total variance of asset i, while
V (εi,t) is the specific component. The only thing to compute is the evolution
of the variance of the CDX index and of each residual series through time.
Given the GARCH structure observed in credit returns described above, we
computed the conditional variances of rCDX ,t and εˆt for each of the 10 GICS
sectors according to a GARCH(1,1) model. The results of the decomposition
are presented in figure 12.
Figure 13 represents the ratio between systematic and total variance in each
sector.
We observe a general increase in the systematic component for every sector,
which is particularly evident during the crisis period. The financial sector
shows the highest fraction of systematic risk compared to all other sectors.
This last indicator can also be interpreted as a measure of the fragility
of a sector. This interpretation is related to the literature concerning the
systematic risk and the frailty factor mentioned in section 2.
The indicator proposed here is much more easily obtained than those discussed
above and simply gives a measure of the variability in credit returns of one
sector that can be explained by one single observed systematic factor. Of
course, if a sector has a very high fraction of its variance explained by one
factor, then it seems plausible to consider it as more vulnerable. From our
analysis emerges that the financial sector shows the highest degree of fragility.
One interesting possibility for future research is to verify the correlation
between the latent frailty factor identified by the previously cited articles
and the measures here computed.
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7.2 Tail dependence
The existence of a systematic component of credit risk originates from the
presence of a fraction of risk in the returns of CDS that is not diversifiable.
In the previous paragraphs, the presence of non-diversifiable risk has been
essentially investigated through the standard Pearson linear correlation,
either directly or through the computation of the linear regression coefficients
β in equation (7).
It seems worthy to verify the existence of commonality in credit returns
beyond the linear Pearson coefficient. In particular, during the last crisis
period the existence of extreme dependence in financial markets has become
evident. Therefore we studied the dependence between credit returns through
the use of copulae.
These functions allow us to model separately the marginal and joint distribu-
tions of returns. In particular, a key result in the theory, Sklar’s theorem,
relates marginal and joint distributions of a random vector in the following
way
H (x1,x2, ...,xn) =C (F1 (x1) ,F2 (x2) , ...,Fn (xn)) (13)
where
• H (x1,x2, ...,xn) is the joint distribution function computed at points
x1,x2, ...,xn
• C (u1,u2, ...,un) is the copula function, which is a function C : [0,1]n→
[0,1]
• Fi (xi) is the ith marginal distribution function computed at the point
xi.
In our case we use as marginal distribution the empirical CDF combined
with a Generalized Pareto distribution for the extreme quantiles. We also
assume that the variances of each margin have a GARCH(1, 1) structure,
which agrees with the empirical findings of section 3. This quite complicated
structure of margins has been successfully applied to the equity market (see
e.g. McNeil and Frey [2000] or Nystrom and Skoglund [2002]) and, due to
the similarities detected before, we extended it to the credit market.
As far as the joint distribution function is concerned, we have to use a
copula function that allows for the presence of extreme tail dependence.
This measure indicates the comovement between two random variables when
extreme events occur, that is when the observed values come from the tails
of the distributions. In particular, it describes the limiting fraction of data
from one variable exceeding a certain quantile given that the other variable
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has exceeded the same quantile. So this quantity can be interpreted as a
measure of the “extreme systematic risk” present in the market.
For some copula functions, such as the Gaussian copula, the tail dependence
is zero. This means that such copulae show asymptotic independence and
no correlation between extreme events. Consequently, we decided to study
extreme correlation using two other copulae: Clayton and Gumbel. They
both belong to the family of Archimedean copulae and are characterized by
the presence of extreme tail dependence. In particular, the Clayton copula
shows extreme lower tail dependence (in the left tail) while Gumbel Copula
shows extreme upper tail dependence (in the right tail). Our work in this
case is quite similar to what Longin and Solnik [2001] applied to the equity
market.
We compute the coefficients of upper and lower tail dependence in the pre-
crisis and post-crisis period for all the possible pairs of sector return. In this
way we obtain a matrix of tail correlation coefficients for all the 10 GICS
sectors considered. We then compute the simple average of all the obtained
correlation coefficients. We observe a considerable increase in both the lower
and upper tail correlation. In particular the left tail coefficient increases
from 0.43 to 0.55 (+26.24%) and the right tail coefficient increases from 0.15
to 0.6 (+288.1%). For a comparison, the standard linear Pearson correlation
coefficient increases from 0.696 to 0.776 (+11.59%) only. This means that
the increase in the non-extreme component of systematic risk is much lower
than the increase in the extreme systematic risk for the credit market. The
results are summarized in the following table.
10/2003-7/2007 7/2007-9/2010 % Change
Linear Pearson Correlation 0.6955 0.7762 +11.59%
Lower tail dep. coefficient 0.4318 0.5451 +26.24%
Upper tail dep. coefficient 0.1535 0.5958 +288.1%
Table 10: Changes in correlations
7.3 Sector analysis
We now analyze in detail the systematic risk of every sector. We start
considering the evolution of the beta coefficient in equation (7) computed
for every sector (Table 11). The average returns of the companies in every
sector used for the regression are equally weighted.
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Sector 10/2003-7/2007 7/2007-9/2010
Materials 1.2111 0.8367
Financials 0.6140 1.3458
Utilities 1.1242 0.5765
Health Care 0.7022 0.4041
Consumer Discretionary 1.3350 1.1267
Energy 1.0795 0.7161
Information Tech. 1.2357 0.7403
Telecomm. 1.7112 0.7951
Industrials 0.6337 0.5749
Consumer Staples 0.5676 0.4270
Table 11: Beta of the sectors
It’s easy to notice a sharp increase in the systematic exposure to systematic
risk of the financial sector in the second period, compensated by a decrease
in all the other sectors.
Given the particular evolution of the systematic exposure of the financial
sector, we repeated the time series and cross section analysis presented above
for the single CDS contracts present in each of the 10 sectors. Cross section
coefficients γ and λ are reported in tables 12 and 13.
10/2003-7/2007 7/2007-9/2010 10/2003-9/2010
Sector γ ·104 t-stat γ ·104 t-stat γ ·104 t-stat
Materials -2.47 -3.94 -1.81 -1.33 -2.1 -1.59
Financials 0.55 0.39 -3.83 -3.81 -3.9 -3.83
Utilities -1.14 -1.66 -0.37 -0.35 -0.52 -0.50
Health Care -0.68 -2.72 -0.32 -1.49 -0.34 -1.52
Consumer Discr. -3.77 -4.48 -4.33 -2.94 -4.49 -3.10
Energy -2.21 -4.03 -1.3 -1.41 -1.43 -1.58
Information Tech. -3.21 -3.59 -4.86 -5.41 -4.83 -5.45
Telecomm. -1.92 -1.99 -1.01 -0.68 -1.19 -0.80
Industrials -0.95 -3.05 -0.3 -0.71 -0.33 -0.77
Consumer Staples -0.67 -0.68 1.22 1.32 1.19 1.28
Table 12: γ of the sectors in the three periods
In this case some sectors include only a small number of companies. This
makes the grouping approach not feasible. We therefore implement an
analysis based on the single CDS and then correct the standard errors (and
consequently the t-stats) according to Shanken [1992].
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10/2003-7/2007 7/2007-9/2010 10/2003-9/2010
Sector λ t-stat λ t-stat λ t-stat
Materials 34 4.21 29 0.80 38 1.08
Financials -22 -0.47 75 5.11 78 4.09
Utilities 26 2.50 16 0.40 22 0.59
Health Care -7 -1.22 -35 -3.70 -33 -3.53
Consumer Discr. 58 5.87 81 2.89 85 3.09
Energy 32 3.97 15 0.57 20 0.77
Information Tech. 81 5.35 202 7.36 197 7.44
Telecomm. 21 2.34 16 0.43 21 0.58
Industrials 7 0.91 -22 -1.46 -21 -1.36
Consumer Staples -35 -1.09 -161 -3.64 -158 -3.57
Table 13: λ of the sectors in the three periods (in bps)
In general we observe a significantly negative value for γ. This agrees with
results in section 5 and implies the relatively limited ability of the model to
describe the entire cross-section of returns. This is true for the majority of
the sectors.
If we consider the slope coefficient λ we observe significant and positive values
for the financial, IT and consumer discretionary sector. On the other hand,
in the health care and Consumer Staples sectors the risk premium realized
in the considered period is negative.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the systematic risk in credit market for a sample
of investment grade firms. The studied variables are the mark-to-market
returns of CDS contracts and their market index, the CDX index, obtained
according to the ISDA Standard Model. Qualitatively similar results are
obtained using the simple first difference in the quoted CDS (or CDX) spread.
Some preliminary investigation of the statistical properties of the returns time
series shows a strongly significant autocorrelation, which tends to decrease
in the second part of the sample. Some predictability is present also when
lagged equity returns are used. Credit returns show a clear GARCH structure,
a strong non-normality and seem to follow a two-state Markow Switching
model.
A linear market model is proposed to describe the returns of the single CDS
position using the market index as a factor. A strong dependence in the time
series dimension is found. In the cross section dimension, the CDX factor is
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priced and a significant risk premium of 37 basis is estimated and seems to
be compatible with previous studies.
However, some evidence is present against the simple linear model here
proposed. In particular, during the crisis and on the entire sample the
presence of a null intercept is rejected.
The evolution of systematic risk before and after the financial crisis is also
investigated. Systematic risk seems to considerably increase during the
crisis when measured by the average R2 of time series regression, by the
variance explained by the first principal components and by the increase in
the extreme tail dependence, which can be interpreted as an indicator of
extreme systematic risk.
Finally a simple decomposition of the variance is proposed to separate
the systematic and specific component. A strong increase in the systematic
fraction is observed during the crisis and the sector with the highest systematic
fraction of variance, and therefore highest sector fragility, is the financial
one.
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9 Figures
Figure 1: Evolution of the CDX North America Investment Grade spread
and the S&P500 Index
Figure 2: Evolution of the CDX North America Investment Grade spread
and the VIX Index
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Figure 3: Autocorrelation Function of the CDX Index returns
Figure 4: Autocorrelation Function of the squared CDX Index returns
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Figure 5: Autocorrelation Functionn of GARCH filtered residuals
Figure 6: Smoothed probability of State 1 and 2 in a Markov switching model
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Figure 7: Rating distribution of the sample
Figure 8: Histogram of the R2 of the 238 time series regressions
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Figure 9: Histogram of the distribution of Betas.
Figure 10: Scatter plot of average spreads versus Beta.
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Figure 11: Scatter plot of average return versus Beta.
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Figure 12: Systematic and specific components of the variance for the 10
GICS sectors
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Figure 13: Fraction of systematic variance for every sector
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Appendix
A The ISDA Standard model
A credit default swap is an agreement between a seller and a buyer of
protection against credit risk. The buyer of protection pays a constant fee
(here indicated by s0) ususally on a quarterly basis. The stream of payments
continues until the maturity of the contract or until a credit event occurs,
whichever is first. Credit events are accurately described in a list written
by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). It does not
include only default events but also, for instance, Repudiation (for sovereign
entities), Restructuring, Failure to pay and others. On the other hand, the
protection seller makes a payment only in presence of a credit event. The net
payment made in case of credit event is equal to the difference between the
par value and the market price of the reference bond. Also the accrual of the
quarterly spread is usually considered. Both physical settlement (with the
delivery of the bond) and cash settlement can take place, though physical
settlement is usually more common.
The market of CDS is Over-the-Counter. So there is no compelling rule
for the computation of the daily mark-to-market of the contract between
the two parties. Nevertheless, the general convention used in the market
is the use of the so-called “Standard Model” proposed by the ISDA. See
e.g. O’Kane and Turnbull [2003] or Berndt and Obreja [2010] for a detailed
description of the model, which originates from the theoretical work by
Hull and White [2000].
The Market Value (MV ) of a CDS contract is given by three components:
the expected present value of the stream of payments made by the buyer of
protection (define it Premium Leg), the expected present value of the accrual
payment at default (define it Accrual Leg) and the expected present value of
the payment made by the seller of protection (define it Protection Leg), that
is
MV = PremiumLeg+AccrualLeg−ProtectionLeg (14)
Therefore PremiumLeg is the expected present value of receiving a stream of
payments equal to s0 for the residual life of the contract. Using the same
notation of O’Kane and Turnbull [2003], this is equal to
PremiumLeg = s0 ·RPV01 (15)
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where RPV01 is the risky present value of 1 dollar received at all the future
payment dates. It is defined “risky” since it is not the simple risk free present
value of an annuity with known number of payments but instead the end of
the stream of payments is random, depending on the occurrence of a default
event. The quantity is equal to
RPV01 =
N
∑
n=1
∆(tn−1, tn)Z (tV , tn)
[
Q(tV , tn)+
1
2
(Q(tV , tn−1)−Q(tV , tn))
]
(16)
where
• tV is the time at which the valuation is done
• ∆(tn−1, tn) is the date count fraction between tn−1 and tn
• Q(tV , tn) is the risk neutral surviving probability between tV and tn
• Z (tV , tn) is the risk free discount factor between tV and tn
We see that this quantity can also be interpreted as a stochastic residual
life of the contract. In the case of a default-free company RPV01 equals the
residual life of the contract and is a deterministic quantity, while in general it
is a random quantity that depends on the default probability of the reference
entity.
The other assumption of the model is that the credit event arrival process
follows a Poisson process of (risk neutral) intensity λ(t). It follows that the
risk-neutral conditional survival probabilities between tV and tn is
Q(tV , tn) = exp
[
−
∫ tn
tV
λ(s)ds
]
(17)
AccrualLeg is the expected present value of the accrual payment made by
the protection buyer. This is the fraction of the spread s0 that corresponds
to the interval of time between the last premium payment and the default
time. It is given by
AccrualLeg =
∫ tN
tV
∆(tns , ts)Z (tV ,s)Q(tV ,s)λ(s)ds (18)
where tns is the payment date immediately before the generic instant ts.
On the other hand, ProtectionLeg is the expected present value of the terminal
payment only in case of default. It is given by
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ProtectionLeg = (1−R)
∫ tN
tV
Z (tV ,s)Q(tV ,s)λ(s)ds (19)
where R is the recovery rate, which is conventionally assumed to be equal to
40%.
Thus the only inputs for the computation of the mark to market value are a
complete term structure of interest rates, the spread of every contract, the
risk neutral surviving probabilities Q or the risk neutral default intensity λ.
As in O’Kane and Turnbull [2003], we extract risk neutral default intensities
and surviving probabilities from the current value of the spread of a newly
issued CDS, assuming that credit events follow a Poisson counting process.
The usual assumption for the practical implementation of the ISDA model
is that the function λ(s) is piecewise constant, which makes straightforward
the computation of the integral in (17).
The model allows us to compute the value of the premium and protection
leg, and therefore the market value of CDS and CDX contracts, at any date.
Returns are computed assuming that every two weeks the position in the
CDS is closed realizing the market value calculated in (14). At the same
date, a new CDS contract is created at the current market spread, and it
will be closed two weeks later. In this way we can correctly use the quoted
CDS spreads, which are referred to newly issued contracts, and at the same
time keep the maturity always close to 5 years. The time series of market
values obtained in this way is then divided by the notional of the contract.
We therefore obtain, since the market value at inception of a CDS contract
is zero, the series of two-weeks variations in market values expressed in
percentage of the notional. This time series is computed for every CDS and
for the CDX index and is the basis of all subsequent analysis.
Due to the presence of stale quotes for some CDS contracts, the frequency
used for the calculation of the returns corresponds to 2 weeks. The final
sample therefore consists of 180 observations.
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Observational Noise ∗
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Abstract
In this paper we analyze some of the most important structural
credit risk models in a state-space framework. We consider asset values
and asset volatilities as state variables while equity values and equity
volatilities are the observable variables. We verify that the filtering
technique outperforms the standard variance restriction and that the
improvement is particularly significant in crisis periods. Furthermore,
the observation of implied volatilities improves the performance of
the simple univariate state space framework already proposed in the
literature. Within the bivariate setting, we compare the credit spreads
implied by the models with the observed CDS spreads. The simple
Merton’s model is the one that performs worst. The extension to
stochastic interest rates and the endogenization of the default only
marginally improves the performance of the fit. Only the inclusion of
a jump component and an endogenous default considerably improves
the performance. Even in this case, however, a part of the market
spreads remains unexplained. We therefore compute the value of the
jump-to-default intensity able to explain observed CDS spreads and
discuss the evolution over time of average implied intensity, jump-to-
default risk premium and diffusion-to-default probability. In periods of
low volatility, the majority of the default probability is constituted by
jump-to-default probability, while in periods of high volatility also the
possibility of a diffusion-to-default event becomes not negligible.
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1 Introduction
The introduction of structural credit risk models dates back to the first
work by Black and Scholes [1973] based on the contingent claim analysis of
corporate liabilities. A refinement of this idea is in Merton [1974] and has
become the first and simplest structural model of credit risk. The idea is to
consider all the liabilities of a company as derivative contracts written on the
unobservable value of its assets. Equity, in particular, has the same payoff of
a call option while debt has the same payoff of a risk-free investment plus a
short position in a put option on the assets.
Since then, many extensions have been introduced into the framework and
several empirical tests of the models have been proposed. The results of such
tests gave rise to the so-called credit spread puzzle, that is the inability of
these simple structural models, when calibrated to historical equity prices and
volatilities, to explain the observed credit spreads. This has been verified for
corporate bond spreads for instance by Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld [1983]
and by Eom, Helwege, and Huang [2004], among others. In some cases also
huge errors in estimated spreads are observed. In the majority of empirical
tests, structural credit risk models have been documented to underestimate
the observed spreads, especially for the shortest debt maturities, and only
in a few studies (e.g. Eom et al. [2004] for some models) an overestimation
is verified. These results are in striking contrast with the elegance of the
models and their totally plausible assumptions. On the other hand, the
usual alternative to structural models, reduced-form models, works better in
explaining credit spreads but often lacks of a clear economic rationale.
In this work, we want to investigate more in depth this issue taking also
into consideration the existence of observational noise in stock prices and
volatilities. This is done through the use of a bivariate state-space framework
which extends the idea proposed by Duan and Fulop [2009]. The objectives
of the paper are therefore to introduce a bivariate state-space framework
in order to filter latent asset and volatility processes. This setup allows
finding these latent variables using standard nonlinear filtering techniques.
On this common ground we then asses the performance of some of the most
popular structural models. We compare the ability of the considered models
to explain observed credit spreads. We concentrate on CDS and not on
corporate bond spreads. The use of CDS instead of corporate bond spreads
is becoming more and more frequent for the test of structural models and, as
argued for example by Huang and Zhou [2008], has several advantages. For
instance, it allows to ignore the presence of fixed or floating coupons in debt
issues and does not need to distinguish the bond issues based on seniority.
Furthermore, if we use bond spreads we have to consider the possible presence
of embedded optionalities, guarantees and liquidity, which is in general very
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low for corporate bond issues.
So we can argue that the CDS spread gives a closer approximation to the
“true” default spread, neglecting additional components and premia present
in the corporate bond spread. Furthermore, as claimed for instance in
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh [2005], a theoretical non-arbitrage relationship
between corporate bond and CDS spreads should hold in non-crisis periods,
while such a relationship is not verified in crisis times due to stronger limits
of arbitrage (see e.g. Fontana [2010]). The use of CDS spreads reduces
these issues and gives a more consistent measure of default risk through the
different market and arbitrage conditions.
Our results seem to confirm the “structural” underestimation of observed
credit spreads even though the size of the error seems smaller than in previous
studies. The model that performs best is Leland [2006], which contemplates
the possibility of a sudden jump to default, and produces a mean absolute
error around 25 bps. This quantity roughly corresponds to half of the total
variation. Nevertheless, a considerable component of the observed CDS
spreads is not explained by any of the considered models. We therefore
concentrate on the best performing model and compute the “implied” jump-
to-default intensity, that is the particular jump intensity able to explain the
observed market spreads.
We find that implied intensities, and consequently risk premia, are on average
higher than the ones proposed in previous studies, at least after the crisis, and
are strongly time varying. Another related finding is the relative behaviour of
jump-to-default and diffusion-to-default probabilities during the considered
period. In particular, the percentage of the default probability explained by
the pure diffusion component seems to be negligible in “quiet” periods but
becomes relevant in high volatility periods, when it accounts for more than
40% of the total default probability. Also the jump-to-default probability
increases during the crisis period but to a much lower extent.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly
review the literature about structural models and their testing. In section 3
we describe the impact of observational noise on structural credit risk models.
In section 4, we describe the most important techniques used to estimate
structural models, while in section 5 we compare the performance of the
considered models under the state-space framework. In section 6 we derive
the implied jump-to-default intensities and the evolution in time of diffusion-
and jump-to-default probabilities. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Review of the literature
As observed by Leland [2009], the literature about structural credit models
is so huge that an exhaustive overview seems impossible. In this section we
concentrate on the evolution of the empirical literature on the performances
of structural credit risk models while we refer to appendix A for a detailed
review of each considered structural model.
Two of the first empirical articles are Jones et al. [1983] and
Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld [1984]. Here the ability of the contingent claim
analysis to price corporate debt is tested for investment and non-investment
grade firms. The result is that, for high-rating companies, the models provide
a strong underestimation and no improvement is achieved with respect to
the use of the risk-free term structure or, equivalently, that the predicted
credit spread is zero. A better fit of the observed credit spreads is achieved
for junk bonds. Furthermore, an improvement in the fit is obtained when a
stochastic component in interest rates and the effect of corporate taxation
are considered.
Also the second article, Jones et al. [1984], documents a relevant underesti-
mation of the spreads. The result is confirmed also by Ogden [1987], who
finds an average underestimation of the Merton [1974] model of 104 bps on
average, and by Lyden and Saraniti [2000], who extend the result also to the
Longstaff and Schwartz [1995] model.
The work by Lyden and Saraniti [2000] supports the negative performance
of the models with average absolute errors between 80 and 90 bps for Merton
[1974] model. They also find that the results are not improved when the pos-
sibility of default before maturity, industry-specific recovery rate or stochastic
interest rates are considered. The simple Merton’s models seems even able to
outperform the Longstaff and Schwartz [1995] model with stochastic interest
rates.
Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann [2001] find that the pure default com-
ponent, measured by structural models, only partially explains the credit
spread on corporate bonds. They also document that another fraction is
explained by the different taxation on corporate and government bonds.
They finally argue that the residual part of the spreads is a premium for
systematic risk and they document that it strongly depends on the classical
Fama and French [1992] factors.
A similar study is the one by Delianedis and Geske [2001], who verify that
the fraction of corporate bond spreads explained by structural models is
in general small and particularly insignificant for high-rating firms. The
explained fraction goes from 5% for AAA firms to 20% for BBB firms.
They also find that neither differential taxation nor stochastic recovery rates
57
improve the quality of the estimation. Only liquidity indicators, market
risk factors (such as market volatility) and the presence of jumps can give a
considerably better fit of the spreads. They also perform an analysis similar
to ours and compute the jump size implicit in observed spreads. Their jumps
do not necessarily drive the firm to default and have an a priori intensity λ.
They find, for λ= 1 (i.e. an expectation of one jump per year), an implied
jump size k = 20%.
Huang and Huang [2003] present an investigation about the ability of struc-
tural models to explain corporate bond spreads. They confirm the difficulties
of the models to justify observed spreads. In particular the fraction of spreads
that can be explained by the models is around 20/30% for long and even
less for short maturities. They identify the unexplained part of the spreads
with a “liquidity” factor and verify that this is much stronger for high-rated
bonds. They implement a relatively large set of models and verify that their
performances are quite similar across the models.
Eom et al. [2004] verify the ability of five structural models to predict
corporate bond spreads. They find that the models by Merton [1974]
and Geske [1977] considerably underestimate observed spreads. On the
other hand, Longstaff and Schwartz [1995], Leland and Toft [1996] and
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein [2001] models overestimate spreads. In gen-
eral, they verify a poor ability of the models to explain spreads and in some
cases they observe also huge errors in the prediction.
A more recent empirical investigation is due to Shaefer and Strebulaev [2008].
The authors confirm the poor performances of structural models in predicting
spreads but provide evidence of their ability to give accurate hedge ratios for
corporate bonds. They justify this with the presence of credit and non-credit
factors in corporate bond spreads. The first category is actually captured by
structural models and this ability is enough to compute correct equity hedge
ratios, since non-credit components are not affected by the returns of the
underlying stock.
Finally, we have to mention the introduction of nonlinear filtering techniques
in the estimation of structural models. A fundamental work in this direction
is Duan and Fulop [2009], where a particle filter is implemented to recover
the unobserved state process that represents the asset value of the firm.
The state space is univariate and the volatility is assumed to be a model
parameter constant in time. A similar model is presented in Huang and Yu
[2010]. The innovation in this last work is the frequency of the time series
(daily) and the bayesian algorithm used for the estimation.
Although a large part of the literature agrees on the poor performances of
structural models in the explanation of credit spreads, the magnitude and
even the sign of the error are still not clear. Our contribution to the existing
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literature consists in the proposal of a new bivariate state-space framework,
which gives a new common framework to assess the predictions of the models,
and in an estimation of the jump risk premium implied in CDS spreads. The
filtering technique allows us to remove a large component of observational
noise and therefore, in analogy with Huang and Yu [2010], we are able to
increase the frequency of the estimation. Consequently, our estimation is at
weekly frequency while much of the previous literature is based on monthly
frequency.
3 Structural Credit risk models and observational
noise
The most important distinction in credit risk models is between structural
and reduced-form models.
Reduced-form credit risk models assume that a jump process governs the
arrival of default events and only the intensity of such process is the object of
the model. The calibration of the model is performed only on past observed
credit spreads and no data from equity market or from the capital structure
of the firm is used.
In structural credit risk models, on the other hand, the different components
of the corporate liabilities of a company, such as equity and debt with
different seniority, are priced as contingent claims on some relevant observed
or unobserved corporate quantities. A link between some structural quantities
of the company and the market value of its liabilities is therefore identified.
A first and most important group of structural models for corporate entities
identifies such corporate quantities with unobserved “stock” variables (such
as the market value of the assets of the company). Another group of models
is based on not necessarily unobserved “flow” quantities (such as the value of
EBIT in Goldstein, Ju, and Leland [2001]). In this work we will concentrate
on the first category of structural models and try to statistically describe
the latent processes.
In appendix A we briefly summarize the structural models considered here.
A common characteristic of the models we are considering in this paper is the
use of the asset value (V ) and asset volatility (σV ) as latent quantities required
to price corporate liabilities. Each of the models provides a specific closed-
form mapping from the latent variables to the observed equity quantities. So
in general
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St = h1
(
Vt ,σVt ,ψt
)
σSt = h2
(
Vt ,σVt ,ψt
)
(1)
where the (possibly nonlinear) functions h1 and h2 map the unobserved asset
value and asset volatility to the observed equity price (S) and equity volatility
(σS). The vector ψt contains exogenous inputs such as interest rate or asset
payout.
In presence of a fully efficient and perfectly liquid market it is immediate to
obtain the values of the unobserved variables V and σV from the observed
variables S and σS. In this case we just need to invert the equity pricing
functions h1 given in equations (16), (22), (23), (30), and (36) of the appendix
and the generic mapping h2 from asset to equity volatility given in equation
(19). This procedure, usually called variance restriction, involves in general
numerical inversion but is straightforward, given the one-to-one closed-form
mapping between unobserved assets and observed equity.
The first justification for the presence of a noise that perturbs equation (1) is
the misalignment between the different liabilities and their theoretical value
based on the assets. Even if we assume that on average the estimates of
the market participants are correct, and consequently that on average the
market keeps equity prices in a non-arbitrage relationship with the assets of
the company, it is known that strong limits to arbitrage are present and that
they can prevent the equilibrium to be reached also for very long periods of
time. This is particularly true in our case, since one of the two positions in
the potential arbitrage strategy, the assets of the company, can be extremely
illiquid and in some cases even not tradable (e.g. intangible assets).
A vast and increasing literature addresses the question of limited arbitrage
opportunities (see e.g. Gromb and Vayanos [2010] for a review). Here we
can summarize them into two big categories. The first one is the presence
of non-fundamental shocks to the demand of corporate liabilities (equity or
corporate bonds) that can be explained by non-rational behaviours of the
agents or by institutional frictions. The second reason are arbitrage costs,
that can arise from the remuneration for arbitrage strategies that are risky,
from the costs of short selling, from the presence of leverage constraints or
finally from equity capital constraints.
Ericsson and Reneby [2002] show that even if assets are not traded, it is
always possible to replicate them using a risk-free bond and a risky security,
such as the equity or debt of the company. This is only partially true in
this context, since the debt and the equity of the company are available only
in limited quantities and their liquidity is often extremely scarce limitating
arbitrage strategies. But even if we assume to be able to replicate the assets
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with equity, for instance, we cannot enforce an arbitrage strategy between
equity, debt and assets unless the debt of the firm is also efficiently traded.
In other words, an arbitrage strategy can be implemented if at least two
claims among equity, debt and assets are traded. It seems difficult to assume
that all the liabilities of the company, that is equity and the entire debt (the
sum of all the loans and bond issues), are efficiently traded.
This limitation in the arbitrage possibilities due to scarce liquidity of some
claims can produce strong and persistent misalignments between the prices
of equity and the true market value of the company. A consequence of this
fact is that it is likely to observe equity prices contaminated by an error with
respect to their equilibrium ‘structural’ values based on the asset process.
Furthermore, the observation of the balance-sheet value of the liabilities
is performed only at discrete times and low frequencies (quarterly for the
companies considered here and even less in general). This means that not
only the observed equity price may be contaminated by noise but also the
face value of debt that we use in the pricing formula. This fact can induce
an even bigger observational noise on equity.
On top of this, we also have to consider the possible presence of microstructure
frictions such as bid-ask bounce or discrete clustering. The impact of these
issues clearly depends on the frequency at which the observations are taken
and we can argue that, at the weekly frequency we are considering here,
this effect is small or even negligible. Nevertheless, a theoretically correct
implementation cannot neglect the impact of microstructure noise.
All these arguments justify the assumption of observational noise and there-
fore the problem of the estimation of V and σV becomes a (nonlinear) filtering
problem.
4 Estimation of Structural Models
A first naive implementation of structural models is simply based on the
solution of a system of two equations in two unknowns, that is equations
(1). The solution of the nonlinear system requires numerical iteration and
gives the two unknowns V and σV . It is possible to solve the system for every
point in the time series and therefore obtain two vectors of estimated asset
values and estimated volatilities.
4.1 Maximum likelihood
The next step towards a more rigorous statistical implementation, especially
from the inferential point of view, which is completely neglected in the naive
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approach, is the estimation technique due to Duan [1994] and based on
likelihood maximization. In this case the presence of observational noise is
still completely neglected and the only observed variable is St , the equity
price. No observation of volatility is required.
The asset value process is assumed to follow a geometric brownian motion.
Therefore the transition density under the physical measure is
log
(
Vt+1
Vt
)
∼ N (µ−δ,σV ) (2)
In this way we can derive the log-likelihood function for a vector of asset
values Vt of length n as
LV
(
Vt , t = 1, ...n;µ,σV
)
=− n−1
2
log(2pi)− n−1
2
log
(
σV 2
)
− 1
2σV 2
n
∑
t=2
(
log
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
−µ+δ
)2
. (3)
Duan [1994] shows that given a deterministic one-to-one transformation
y = T (x;θ), it is possible to express the likelihood of yt , t = 1, ...n in terms of
the likelihood of xt , t = 1, ...n. In particular
LY (yt , t = 1, ...n;θ) = LX (xˆt , t = 1, ...n;θ)−
n
∑
i=1
log
∣∣∣∣dTi (xˆi;θ)dxi
∣∣∣∣ (4)
where xˆi = T−1i (yi;θ). When we apply this general result to our specific case,
we have T (V ;θ) = h1 (V ;θ) and therefore the log-likelihood of equity given
the parameters of the asset process is
LS
(
St , t = 1, ...n;µ,σV
)
=− n−1
2
log(2pi)− n−1
2
log
(
σV 2
)
−
n
∑
t=2
log(N (dt))
− 1
2σV 2
n
∑
t=2
(
log
(
Vˆt
Vˆt−1
)
−µ+δ
)2
(5)
where Vˆt is the inverse of the Black-Scholes formula and dt =
log(Vt/F)+σV
2T/2
σV
√
T
.
In this way we can numerically maximize the likelihood function on µ and
σV . With the estimated parameters we can invert the Black-Scholes pricing
formula and obtain a vector of estimated asset values. If we are working
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under the risk-neutral measure we can set µ = r−δ and maximize over σV
only.
The most important drawbacks of this model are that it completely neglects
the presence of observational noise and that it does not consider the possible
variability of the volatility parameter in time. This is a consequence of the
strict Black-Scholes assumption of constant deterministic volatility. The time
series of equity prices is therefore enough to determine the parameter σV and
is the only required input.
4.2 A state-space framework
If we want to take into consideration the presence of an observational noise
and also to exploit the observation of equity volatility (e.g. options implied
volatility), we need to rearrange our model in a state-space form.
It is possible to describe a generic state-space model by a state equation
and a measurement equation. The first one determines the dynamics of the
usually unobserved state variables while the second relates the unobserved
states to some observable variables. So in general the data generating process
for the states X is
Xt = f (Xt−1,θ)+ εt (6)
where θ is a vector of parameters and the noise vector ε is a multivariate
normal with zero mean and covariance matrix W .
On the other hand, the measurement equation is
Yt = h(Xt ,θ)+ηt (7)
where the noise vector η is still a multivariate normal with zero mean and
covariance matrix N.
All the considered structural models are characterized by the presence of a
set of latent and a set of observed random processes. The first implemen-
tation of structural credit risk models in a state-space framework is due to
Duan and Fulop [2009]. They assume that the unobserved signal X is the
(log-)asset value log(V ) and that the observed variable Y is the (log-)price of
equity. The “true” value of equity is contaminated by a univariate trading
noise η.
The filtering procedure of the latent process requires the estimation of the
model parameters and in particular the asset volatility σV and the noise
covariance N that in this case is a scalar. Duan and Fulop [2009] assume that
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σV is constant and deterministic during the entire estimation period. The
resulting model is fully equivalent to Duan [1994] with the only assumption
that a noise η is present and contaminates equity prices.
In this work we model the asset value process {Vt}∞t=1 and the asset volatility
process
{
σVt
}∞
t=1 as two unobserved processes in discrete time.
In order to guarantee the non-negativity of the asset and volatility process,
as in Duan and Fulop [2009], in the data generating system, we do not model
directly V and σV but rather their natural logarithms.
Therefore, the joint discrete-time dynamics of the two variables are given by
the following unobserved state equations
(
log(Vt)
log
(
σVt
) )= A ·( log(Vt−1)
log
(
σVt−1
) )+( r
0
)
∆t +
(
ε1t
ε2t
)
(8)
where A is a 2×2 real transition matrix and ε is bivariate normal noise vector
with zero mean and covariance matrix W . In this way we are restricting the
generic functions f in equation (6) to only linear ones.
The observed variables are the price process of equity St and its volatility
process σSt , which are both function of Vt and σVt possibly contaminated by
noise. In particular, the observation equations are given by
(
St
σSt
)
=
(
h1
(
Vt ,σVt ,ψt
)
h2
(
Vt ,σVt ,ψt
) )+( η1tη2t
)
(9)
We assume that ηt is a bivariate gaussian noise vector with zero mean and
covariance matrix N
The functions h1 and h2, are different for every considered structural model
and are described in appendix A for every specific case. These two functions
fully identify the most commonly used structural credit risk models.
4.3 A simulation exercise
To verify the ability of the filtering procedure to capture the unobserved
asset process, we cannot rely on real-world data since we do not have any
information about the true latent asset process of traded stocks. We therefore
implement the following simulation exercise.
We jointly simulate the asset and volatility processes according to equation
(8) for 250 days, which corresponds to one year of daily observations. We then
use equation (9) and a simulated noise η to get the simulated contaminated
processes for S and σS. After that, we apply the filtering technique to recover
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the process for the assets. We compute the mean squared error between the
true underlying asset process and the filtered path. We do the same using
the naive inversion and the UKF technique. Therefore we get two values of
MSE for each simulated path.
Given the slowness of the procedure and the strong stability of the results,
we repeat the procedure only 500 times and for 100 increasing values of the
noise volatility, i.e. the standard deviation of process η. We finally take the
average over the 500 simulations. The resulting average MSE is plotted as
function of the noise volatility in Figure 1.
We clearly see that, for small values of the noise, the errors of the two
procedures are comparable while for increasing noise the filtering method
outperforms the naive inversion technique. The performance of the filtering
procedure is therefore always at least as good as the inversion implementation.
We argue that this advantage comes from two sources. The first one is the
obvious ability of the particle filter to eliminate the noise perturbation. The
second one is a simple numeric issue, that is the difficulty of the numeric
algorithm to invert the nonlinear system (9), due to the analytic complexity
of the functions involved or to functions flat around zero.
4.4 Implementation
The implementation of the Duan [1994] model is straightforward, since it
involves only a simple maximization of the likelihood function in equation (5),
which gives a unique estimated value for the asset variance in the considered
time period.
The implementation of all the other models is based on nonlinear filtering
and requires either the UKF or the Square-Root UKF. The performance of
the two algorithms are fully comparable. Due to the slightly better ability of
the SR-UKF to explain observed CDS spreads and to its relatively better
efficiency, we present only the results obtained with this algorithm. For a
more detailed description of the algorithms, refer to appendix B.
The first step is the implementation of the simple model by Duan and Fulop
[2009] in a state space framework. In this case the functions f and h are
both scalar-valued. In particular, the function h is given by equation (16) of
the appendix. We therefore have only one latent state, the asset process and
one observable, the price of equity. The state process is governed, under the
risk-neutral measure, by only one unknown parameter, σV , to be estimated.
Since the parameter is not time-varying we exclude the implementation of
the asset volatility as a parameter of the model. The natural estimation
technique is therefore the standard maximum likelihood procedure. Given
the computational time required by the UKF algorithm to run, we do not
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implement a numerical maximization of the parameter σV , since at every
iteration a new estimation of the UKF is required. We therefore build a grid
for σV , run a SRUKF filter to recover the latent process Vt and compute the
likelihood at every point of the grid according to equation (5). We then take
the value of σV for which the likelihood is maximum. This involves a number
of computations of the filter equal only to the number of points in the grid,
which we set to 300.
This implementation requires only the time series of (log) equity prices, the
prior moments of the state x0 (which in this case is simply the log-price)
and the initial values of the parameters in matrix A in equation (8), which
in this case is a scalar. In the more general bivariate case the state x0 is a
vector with the log-price and the log-volatility of the asset process, Vt and
σVt and A is a 2-by-2 transition matrix. We get an approximated estimate of
the matrix A and the moments of x0, required by the algorithm, from the
simple inversion of function h(·) under the assumption of no noise. In this
way we get an approximation of the time series V and σV from which we can
find a proxy of all the required priors. The reliability of the estimation is
not essential, since such parameters are used only as starting values for the
algorithm and are changed at every iteration until convergence.
We also performed the estimation of the models using log-returns in place of
log-prices in equation (8) for both asset values and volatilities. We observe
that in this case the performance of the estimation is poorer. This may be
due to the fact that all the structure present in the level data is lost when
we take the first difference. In other words, in the time-series in levels the
matrix A in equation (8) is significantly different from zero and the elements
on its main diagonal are close to one. On the other hand, when we work
with first differences all the elements of the matrix are close to zero and give
no insight into the structure of the data generating process. Consequently,
in the first difference case, the time series we are filtering is very close to
pure noise, giving less reliable results and more limited information.
In some of the considered models some estimation of exogenous parameters is
also needed. One can decide whether to include the parameters into the set
of state variables or alternatively to estimate the parameters separately and
to use them as exogenous variables. In all the models, we follow this second
strategy in order to leave unchanged the dimension of the state-variable
vector and avoid possible identification problems.
The first parameter needed is the dividend yield, which is required in
Leland and Toft [1996] and in Leland [2006] model. In this case we as-
sume a constant dividend yield equal to 2%, compatible with the historical
mean on the Dow Jones Ind. Average index on the same period (2.44%).
In these last two models an assumption on the average coupon paid on the
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outstanding debt is also required. In the Leland and Toft [1996] model we
assume that no coupon is paid while in the Leland [2006] we follow the
original paper and assume that the coupon C is numerically chosen in such a
way that the market value of the debt is always equal to its par value.
In the stochastic interest rate model, the correlation parameter ρ between the
equity and interest rate risk sources is required. This parameter is estimated
empirically for every considered company and for simplicity it is assumed
to be constant in time. The estimation procedure for ρ involves, in a first
step, the solution of the standard Merton’s model that provides us with an
approximation of the asset value process Vt . After that, we compute the
sample Pearson correlation between the approximated asset returns and the
first difference in the short-term interest rate. In general, we observe values
of ρ between 0 and 30%. So it seems that the correlations between asset
returns and changes in the interest rate are positive and in general significant.
The sample average of ρ is 0.18 and its cross-sectional standard deviation is
9.52%. This result supports the empirical implication of Merton’s model, for
which an increase in interest rates has a positive effect on the market value
of assets since it increases its risk-neutral drift rate.
In this type of models we also need an estimation of the parameters in
equation (20) of the appendix. In this case the estimation of the interest rate
curve parameters is performed separately from the estimation of the asset
and volatility processes. This procedure simplifies the filtering operation,
which remains bivariate, and is fully consistent with previous literature (e.g.
Huang and Zhou [2008]). We start with the discrete-time counterpart of the
considered stochastic differential equation.
rt = αt + γtrt−1 + εt (10)
Coefficients α and γ are indexed with t since we allow for time-varying
parameters. The estimation is performed using a Kalman filter and assuming
that the processes for αt and γt follow an AR(1) process. Therefore
rt = αt + γtrt−1 + εt
αt = a1αt−1 +η1,t (11)
γt = a2γt−1 +η2,t
Next we compute the standard deviation of the estimated residual set = std(εˆi)
for i = 1, ..., t.
The parameters of equation (20) can finally be obtained as
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kt = − log(γt)∆t (12)
θt =
αt
1− γt (13)
νt = set
√
−2log(a)
∆t (1− γ2)
where ∆t is the time interval between two observations 1.
As far as models with jumps are concerned, a final required input is the
risk-neutral intensity of the jump to default process, which is always assumed
to be a Poisson process. We start from the historical default probability
obtained from Moody’s data for each rating class. After that, we transform
this historical probability into a risk-neutral one using the risk premium
µ obtained by Driessen [2005]. We then subtract from the entire default
probability the probability of default explained by the pure risk-neutral
diffusion process. This amounts to the probability of a first passage time
of a geometric Brownian motion to a threshold. The result is a probability
of jump-to-default, which can be easily transformed into the corresponding
intensity.
As a proxy for the corporate tax rate, we assume a value of 35%, while
the recovery rate, which is needed for the computation of the jump size, is
obtained from Moody’s historical data based on the rating class.
The models by Leland and Toft [1996] and Leland [2006] also assume that
the debt is continuously repaid at a rate m. In our implementation we assume
a value of m = 0.2, which gives an average maturity of the outstanding debt
exactly equal to 5 years. This is the horizon we are considering for every
model and also the horizon of the CDS spreads we are trying to fit. Default
costs are set to α= 0.1, which is 10% of the asset value but our estimation
is quite robust to different choices of α.
A final element that has to be taken into consideration is a required burn-in
period in the UKF procedure. The estimation of the posterior distribution
based on the Unscented Kalman Filter technique requires the convergence of
a Markov chain to a stationary distribution. The first estimations in the time
series don’t have necessarily converged yet to the stationary distribution and
therefore need to be excluded from the final estimation. Consequently, we
1As argued by Lo [1988] and Broze, Scaillet, and Zakoian [1995] the estimation of the
parameters of a continuous time process by means of its discrete-time counterpart induces
bias and inconsistency in the estimated parameter. Nonetheless the bias is known to
be relatively small (see e.g. Broze et al. [1995]) and the unbiased estimators are not
straightforward to implement in the case of time-varying parameters.
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have to consider a number of observations to be excluded at the beginning
of each estimated time series. Usually the convergence is extremely rapid
and in less than 10 observations it is always reached.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Description of the data
The sample period starts with the beginning of the liquid CDS market and
corresponds to January 2003-December 2011. We include all the firms that
have been part of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index during this period.
Given the difficulties to identify a correct value for the defaultable liabilities,
we exclude from our analysis financial companies as in the majority of the
literature, with the only exclusion of Lyden and Saraniti [2000].
In table 1 we present the considered companies and some descriptive statistics
of the corresponding CDS spreads. A first characteristic of the data is the
extreme dispersion in the cross-sectional and, most of all, in the time-series
dimension. This is confirmed by the high difference between maxima and
minima in the series. A relevant positive skewness is also present, since we
observe values of the mean in general higher (and sometimes much higher)
than the median.
We take equity prices, quarterly balance-sheet data, adjustment factors and
the number of outstanding shares from Datastream. The time series of the
debt-per-share (DPS) is then obtained as
DPSt =
STt + 12LTt
Nosht
·AFt (14)
where STt are short-term liabilities and LTt long-term liabilities at time t.
Nosh is the number of outstanding shares and AF is the adjustment factor,
which accounts for stock splits and other corporate actions.
We obtain estimates of volatility from call options with a delta of 0.4 and
a maturity of two years, which is the longest still liquid maturity available.
The source is in this case OptionMetrics.
The CDS spreads we are considering are referred to contracts with 5-year
maturity, which is known to be the most liquid in the market, and are taken
from Bloomberg. For each reference entity we take the longest possible time
series of CDS spreads even though in some case the first observation is after
the 1st of January 2003.
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As a proxy for the risk-free rate we use the US Treasury constant maturity 5-
years rate taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Database. The maturity
is again chosen to match the one of the CDS spreads we are considering. The
frequency of our analysis is weekly so that we are left with 470 observation
dates.
Company Weekly Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Median Max.
3M 418 28.2 24.6 4.7 20.9 132.5
AT&T 418 58 60.7 8.2 40.1 361.2
Alcoa 470 151.5 185.7 15.9 48.6 1043.3
Boeing 470 62.7 55.3 6.5 54.7 330
Caterpillar 470 59.3 60.8 11.2 32.7 403.8
Chevron 418 30.2 24.3 3.5 22.1 132.8
Cisco Systems 417 41.7 33 2 36.8 170.2
Coca Cola 417 28.8 19.5 6.5 25.8 99.9
El Du Pont 470 41 32.8 8.7 24.4 215.1
Exxon Mobil 418 21.7 19.5 2.5 19.3 113.6
General Electric 447 128.5 157.6 10.9 43.8 976.1
Hewlet-Packard 470 40.4 26.6 7.8 31.6 155.9
Home Depot 418 63.5 65.5 7.3 57 353.8
Intel 185 51.7 17.4 26.3 52.3 87.3
IBM 470 33.6 19.9 6.5 30.8 133.3
J&J 418 23 18.6 2.9 14.3 76.3
Kraft Foods 470 52.8 28 13.1 51.4 178.8
McDonalds 470 31.6 13.7 10 30 78.3
Merk & CO. 418 30 17 5.8 30 82.5
Microsoft 276 24.3 12.4 7.5 26.1 55.3
Pfizer 418 33.4 28.6 3.5 22.1 132
P&G 418 35.6 29.2 5.5 33.1 149.4
United Tech. 418 37.6 28.4 8.5 31.1 148.3
Verizon Comm. 467 52.5 22.4 16.5 53.2 103.5
Wal Mart Stores 470 31.9 24 5.9 22.2 133.4
Walt Disney 470 43.9 22.2 9.8 41.4 126.3
Honeywell 418 35.8 22.4 10.5 32.3 150
Altria 418 93.4 44.7 19.2 95 218.3
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the considered CDS
5.2 Improved estimation
With the simulation exercise proposed above, we have already verified that
the filter is always at least as good as the inversion technique and, for
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increasing noise volatility, it starts outperforming the variance restriction
method. Another way to verify the improvement of the filtering technique
over the simple variance restriction procedure in absence of observations of
the latent asset process is to look at the ability to explain observed CDS
spreads. We compute the squared error between the observed CDS spreads
and those estimated from Merton’s model and then average each of them in
the cross-section dimension. In this way we obtain a time series of squared
errors for the variance restriction and the filtering technique. We then test if
the errors of the filtering technique are statistically higher than those of the
variance restriction. For this purpose, we implement the test proposed by
Diebold and Mariano [1995]. The null hypothesis we are testing is
H0 : E
(
ε21,t
)
= E
(
ε22,t
)
where ε1,t is the estimation error of the variance restriction and ε2,t is the
estimation error of the filtering technique. The test statistic is
S =
d¯√
LRV/T
asy∼ N (0,1)
where
• d¯ = 1T ∑ j=1T di
• di = ε21,i− ε22,i
• LRV = γ0 +2∑Tj=1 γi
• T is the number of observations
• γi is the autocovariance of order i of the vector d.
The value of the test on the entire sample is S = 1.253, which is not sta-
tistically significant at any standard confidence level (the p-value is 0.105).
Nevertheless, a testable prediction of the filtering technique is the improve-
ment in performances in periods of high “noise” in financial markets, such as
periods of limited liquidity or arbitrage. We therefore split the considered
period in a “crisis” period and a “non-crisis”. This is objectively done by
fitting a two-states Markov switching model on the time series of the TED
spread, a widely used indicator of illiquidity and frictions in the financial
markets. The model identifies the beginning of the crisis period with August
14th 2008 and the end with May 18th 2009. After that the levels of the TED
spread considerably decreased.
We find that, if we consider the estimation errors on the crisis period only,
the filtering technique significantly outperforms the naive numerical inversion.
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When we compute the Diebold-Mariano test in the crisis period only we
find S = 2.267 with a p-value of 0.0117. We can therefore reject at a 95%
confidence level that the filter has the same performance of the naive inversion
in crisis periods.
5.3 A comparison of the models
Once verified the ability of the filtering technique to capture the latent asset
process, we assess the performances of the five considered models in the
explanation of observed market CDS spreads. We have to notice that all the
data we are using to fit spreads come from equity and options market and no
input is taken from the bond or CDS market. This means that the test is a
true out-of-sample one, while a part of the existing literature adopts different
econometric techniques to fit observed spreads (see e.g. Huang and Zhou
[2008] or Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis [2005]) using corporate variables.
Our results confirm the presence of the credit spread puzzle, since the
percentage of explained variation is always less than 50%. A large amount of
variation remains therefore unexplained. Nevertheless the error seems smaller
than in previous studies (e.g. Jones et al. [1984] or Ogden [1987]), especially
when we consider that all the companies in the sample are highly rated. We
argue that the reason for this is twofold. First, we are working on CDS and
not on corporate bond spreads, and in this way we can eliminate the presence
of premia (such as liquidity) and concentrating on pure default premium.
Second, the use of the filtering technique filters out the observational noise
in the time series for equity and equity volatility.
The use of stochastic interest rates improves the performance only to a small
extent. The endogenization of the default, per se, gives no improvement on
the Merton’s model. The inclusion of discontinuities in the asset process, on
the other hand, improves the fit. The Leland [2006] model is the one that
performs best in our analysis and gives a RMSE and a MAE of 46 and 25
bps, respectively. The model is able to explain between 40 and 50% of the
total variation in the spreads.
We also have to take into account that the required risk premium, described
is section 4, is assumed to be constant in time. Further research could be
oriented to the design of a more efficiently estimated time-varying jump risk
premium, in order to improve the performance of the fit.
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Model Root Mean Sq. Error Mean Abs. Error
Merton 67 (17.9%) 45 (8.9%)
Stochastic IR 60 (26.2%) 42 (14.4%)
Merton + Jump 54 (34.4%) 32 (34.9%)
Leland Toft [1996] 72 (12.6%) 46 (6.3%)
Leland [2006] 46 (43.6%) 25 (48.2%)
6 Implied default intensity and jump risk premium
As suggested in the previous paragraph, the Leland [2006] model is the one
that performs best when compared to the others. Nevertheless, we can say
that, even for the best model, the fit is far from perfect, with a mean squared
error of 36 basis points. This is particularly true for the investment grade
firms considered here, characterized by small CDS spreads. Therefore a purely
structural model based only on data from equity and options market does not
seem to be completely satisfactory. In particular, a common characteristic
that we find in the considered models is the underestimation of the observed
CDS spreads. This is true for diffusion but also for jump-diffusion models,
when we use a default intensity compatible with observed default rates and
reasonable risk-premia.
We therefore want to verify which value of the default intensity is needed to
justify the observed CDS spread. This is achieved for the single CDS and for
every observation by numerically solving for the “implied” jump-to-default
intensity. In this case, and by construction, the fit to the spreads is almost
perfect, with a mean squared error of around one basis point.
The evolution in time of the average implied default intensity is represented
in Figure 2. We observe considerably higher values of the implied intensity
after the crisis and two minimum levels in summer 2003 and spring 2007.
The maximum implied intensity is observed during the peak of the financial
crisis, at the beginning of 2009.
The values of the implied jump-to-default intensity are much higher than
the historical risk-neutralized jump-to-default intensities obtained in Section
4. We can also compare the implied intensities with the ones suggested in
Leland [2006]. In the first part of the sample the implied intensity is between
the one of an A and a Baa rated company, while the average rating of our
sample is between Aa3 and A1. Therefore the difference is not extreme. On
the other hand, after the crisis we have to require the intensities of a B-rated
company to explain the observed spreads. This supports the presence of a
structural change after the crisis.
The ratio of risk-neutral to physical intensities is proportional to the state
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price per unit probability and therefore it is a measure of the risk premium.
The evolution over time of this measure of risk premium is presented in figure
3. We observe generally low risk premia in the first part of the sample (a
ratio of one implies no premium for bearing risk) while a peak is reached
during the financial crisis, indicating the deterioration of the risk appetite in
this period. The risk premium estimated by Driessen [2005] is equal to 2.15,
which seems comparable with our estimation only for the first period of the
analysis. In the second part the estimated premium seems much higher and
considerably time-varying. The jump risk premium required to explain the
observed CDS spreads varies a lot in time and therefore assuming it to be
constant can be a serious limitation.
6.1 Diffusion-to-default and jump-to-default probability
This section compares the diffusion-to-default probability with the implied
jump-to-default probability. We obtain the diffusion-to-default from the
Leland [2006] model computing the probability that the asset process condi-
tional on no jump reaches the endogenously determined default threshold VB
(see appendix A). This approach gives a more sophisticated estimate than
the simple Merton’s model as a consequence of the endogenization of the
default event.
The jump-to-default probability can be computed from the implied intensity
obtained in the previous paragraph easily providing a probability on the
considered time horizon.
The jump-to-default probability in figure 5 shows a slightly increasing trend
during the considered period and reaches the maximum during the financial
crisis. Diffusion-to-default probability, on the other hand, remains always
close to zero and only during the crisis grows sharply, as we can see from figure
4. This is arguably due to the extreme increment in the observed implied
volatilities that causes a corresponding spike in the default probabilities.
If we look at the area plot of the two default probabilities we see that the role
played by diffusion to default is in general very limited and only in periods
of very high volatility and distress it becomes relevant (see figure 6).
This impression is confirmed when we plot the fraction of default probability
constituted by diffusion-to-default (see figure 7). The ratio is close to zero
in “standard times” while it increases significantly during the crisis and in
correspondence of the Lehman default the explosion of implied volatilities
makes it close to 0.5, which means that in this period half of the default
probability came from diffusion-to-default.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a bivariate state space framework for the estimation
of structural credit risk models. We considered five of the most popular
models able to express the equity of a firm as a closed-form function of the
value and the volatility of the assets. The implied credit spread is therefore
computed from the market value of debt. We compare the explained credit
spread with the market CDS spreads for each of the models.
We assume the existence of two state variables, the asset value and assets
volatility, and two observable variables, the equity value and equity volatility.
The recovery of the latent states amounts to a nonlinear filtering problem,
which is solved using an Unscented Kalman Filter algorithm.
We find that the bivariate framework improves the performance of the simple
univariate state space. Within our bivariate framework, the simple Merton’s
models is the one that performs worst. The extension to stochastic interest
rates improves the performance of the fit only by a small amount. Also the
endogenization of the default threshold proposed by Leland and Toft [1996]
gives no clear improvement with respect to the standard Merton’s model.
Only the joint inclusion of a jump component and an endogenous default
considerably improves the fit. This model has been proposed by Leland
[2006] and is the one that performs best.
Even for the best performing model, however, we verify the existence of a
considerable portion of the market spread that remains unexplained. We
therefore compute a measure of “implied” jump-to-default intensity, that is
the value of the default intensity parameter that is able to explain market
spreads.
We observe an increase in the value of average implied intensity during
the considered period with a peak reached around the Lehman crisis. We
also compare the implied intensity with the historical one, obtaining in
this way an estimate of the jump-to-default risk premium. This quantity
is comparable with previous studies in the first part of the sample, while
it becomes substantially higher from the beginning of the financial crisis.
Furthermore, the risk aversion seems to vary a lot during time, making
unplausible the assumption of constant risk premia.
As far as the evolution of diffusion-to-default and jump-to-default probabilities
are concerned, we observe that in “quiet” periods, characterized by low
volatility, the vast majority of the default probability is constitued by jump-
to-default while, in periods of high volatility, also the possibility of a diffusion-
to-default event becomes not negligible.
A promising application of the filtering technique is the estimation of the
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spreads for companies with very illiquid equity or opaque flows of information
and consequently with higher observational noise. We can argue that in this
case the improvement over the standard maximum likelihood or variance
restriction techniques would be would be even higher.
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Figure 1: MSE of the estimated assets as a function of the observational
noise
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Figure 2: Average jump-to-default intensity implied in the CDS spreads
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Figure 3: Average jump-to-default Risk premium
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Figure 4: Evolution of the diffusion-to-default probability
Sep02 Jan04 May05 Oct06 Feb08 Jul09 Nov10 Apr12
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
Jump−to−default probability
Figure 5: Evolution of the jump-to-default probability
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Figure 6: Evolution of the diffusion-to-default and jump-to-default probability
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Appendix
A Considered structural models
A.1 Merton’s Model
The relevant literature in the structural credit risk models field originates
from the articles by Black and Scholes [1973] and Merton [1974], in which
the liabilities of a company are seen as simple European options written on
the asset value process of the firm.
The first and simplest structural credit risk model is due to Merton [1974].
The capital structure of the company is extremely simplified. The debt
consists of a single zero-coupon bond with maturity T and face value F . The
default event can happen only at the maturity T and not before. Due to the
limited liability rule, the debt at maturity will be worth D(T ) = min(F,VT ) =
F−max(F−VT ,0), where F is the face value and V the market value of the
assets. This payoff is equal to a fixed amount of cash F plus a short position
in a put option written on V with strike price F. So, in order to avoid
arbitrage, the value of risky debt today has to be equal to D = F · e−rT − p,
where p is the current price of the European put option.
On the other hand, the value of equity in T will be ST = max(VT −F,0). This
is exactly the payoff of a European call option written on V with strike
price F. Therefore, by non-arbitrage, the price of equity today has to be
equal to the price of the call written on V . This result is based on the set
of assumptions that is standard in the Black-Scholes world, that is: perfect
markets, continuous trading, constant volatility, deterministic and constant
interest rates, infinite liquidity, Ito dynamics for the asset value process.
More precisely, the assumption of the model is that V follows a geometric
Brownian motion
dV
V
= (r−δ)dt +σVdZ (15)
and consequently it is possible to price the put option present in the value
of debt and the call option present in the value of equity by the standard
Black-Scholes formula. Thus
S = BS
(
V,σV ,r,δ,T,F
)
(16)
where
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• S is the equity price
• r is the deterministic risk free interest rate
• δ is the average payout rate of the total assets of the company
• σV is the constant deterministic instantaneous volatility of asset returns
• the function BS (·) indicates the Black-Scholes price for a call option
All the structural models we are considering here give a (closed-form) mapping
from the value and volatility of the assets to the value and volatility of the
equity. In this simple model the mapping from asset value to equity value is
just the standard Black-Scholes call pricing formula. In order to obtain the
mapping from σV to σS we need to compute the instantaneous dynamics of
equity. We apply Ito’s lemma to equation (16) and get
dS =
∂S
∂V
V (r−δ)dt + ∂S
∂V
VσVdZ+
∂S
∂t
dt +
1
2
∂2S
∂V 2
V 2
(
σV
)2
dt (17)
=
[
∂S
∂V
V (r−δ)+ 1
2
∂2S
∂V 2
V 2
(
σV
)2]
dt +
∂S
∂V
VσVdZ (18)
We can therefore obtain the instantaneous volatility of equity from the
diffusion coefficient of assets
SσS =
∂S
∂V
VσV (19)
In the case of the simple Merton’s model the derivative on the right hand
side of the last equation is just the Black-Scholes delta, that is N (d1). In
more general cases a numerical derivation may be required.
An improvement of this simple framework that we are not considering here
is the possibility of a default at every instant of time before the maturity
of the debt. This refinement is due to Black and Cox [1976] and is also
present in other important articles such as Longstaff and Schwartz [1995].
In these works equity is considered as a barrier option and the default event
is triggered at the first hitting time of an exogenously determined barrier.
Another factor neglected in Merton’s model and developed for instance
in Brennan and Schwartz [1978] is the role of corporate taxation and tax
shields.
A.2 Merton’s Model in presence of stochastic interest rates
Another line of evolution is the assumption of stochastic interest rates in the
model. This improvement is achieved by many authors, the most important
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of which are Ronn and Verma [1986], Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan
[1993], Briys and de Varenne [1997] and also Longstaff and Schwartz [1995].
In our work we assume that interest rates are stochastically defined using
the short-term interest rate model proposed by Vasicek [1977]. In this case
the capital structure and the default schedule remain as simple as in the
original Merton’s model. Therefore, under the risk-neutral measure, the
instantaneous interest rates dynamics are given by
dr = k (θ− r)dt +νdZr (20)
or, under a different parametrization,
dr = (ζ−βr)dt +νdZr (21)
where Zr is a standard brownian motion characterized by a correlation ρ
with the Brownian motion Z in equation (15) and k, θ, ν, ζ and β are real
(and in general positive) constants.
The drawbacks of this simple model are that the possible shapes of the term
structure are quite limited and that the probability of negative interest rates,
though very small for reasonable parametrizations, is not zero. Nonetheless,
the model is still widely used in practice.
According to Rabinovitch [1989], the price of a call option written on V
under a stochastic interest rate determined by the Vasicek model is
S =VN (d1)−FPN (d2) (22)
where
• d1 = (σ1,1+σ1,2−a)√b
• d2 = d1−
√
b
• P = e( 12σ2,2−B)
• B =−1k
[(
r0− kθ−νqk
)(
e−kT −1)− (kθ−νq)T]
• a = σ1,1/2−B+ log(F/V )
• b = σ1,1 +2σ1,2 +σ2,2
• σ1,1 = σV 2T
• σ1,2 = σνρk
(
e−kT−1
k +T
)
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• σ2,2 = ν2k2
(
T − 3+e
−kT(e−kT−4)
2k
)
• q is the premium for bearing interest rate risk
Under the same assumptions of Merton [1974] model, we can consider the
equity of a company as a call on the assets. Therefore equation (22) gives us
the required mapping from assets V to equity S.
A.3 Merton’s Model in presence of simple jumps in the asset
process
Another possible extension of the simple model for the asset process proposed
by Merton is the inclusion of jumps. This extension has been suggested in
order to overcome the observed underestimation of credit spreads by standard
Merton’s model, and in particular the tendency of estimated spreads to
converge to zero as the maturity of the debt tends to zero documented e.g. in
Lando [2004]. In this way the process {Vt}∞t=1 includes two components, a pure
diffusion which is still assumed to follow a geometric brownian motion, and
a pure jump component. The first implementation of a jump-diffusion model
of this form is due to Merton [1976]. Unfortunately a realistic description
of a jump diffusion model, characterized for example by the presence of
random jumps of infinitely many sizes, does not allow for a closed-form
pricing formula like equation (16).
In this work we discuss only models that give a closed-form mapping between
V and S. We therefore limit ourselves to a simple characterization of jumps.
Only jumps with a constant deterministic size k are allowed. The size
k is computed in such a way that, in the event of a jump, the company
immediately defaults and the asset value goes to a level compatible with
the recovery rate on debt historically observed for the rating group of the
company (from Moody’s data).
Furthermore, we still assume that δ is the average payout rate of the assets
and λ is the (risk-neutral) default intensity parameter. Default event is again
possible only at the maturity of the debt.
In this case a very simple closed-form pricing formula for european options
is available
S = BS
(
V,σV ,r,δ,T,F
) ·(e−λT)+ e−rT max(V (1− k)−F,0)(1− e−λT) (23)
which gives us the required mapping from assets to equity.
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A.4 Leland and Toft [1996] Model
In all the models mentioned until now, the default threshold is exogenously
determined. A fundamental improvement in the literature is the endoge-
nization of the default point. In this perspective, the firm optimally and
continuously decides whether to default on its obligations or not and con-
sequently dynamically optimizes its capital structure. The first attempt in
this direction is due to Leland [1994] who considers only infinite-life debt.
A popular extension of this is the model by Leland and Toft [1996] who
consider finite-maturity debt and are able to obtain a closed-form solution to
the price of risky debt and, consequently, of equity. In this framework also
tax advantages and costs of default are considered and have an influence on
the optimal capital structure choice of the firm.
The stochastic process V u for the unlevered value of the assets of the firm is
as usually given by
dV u
V u
= (µ(V u, t)−δ)dt +σdZ (24)
where δ is the average payout rate of the assets. The company has an out-
standing debt with finite maturity T and continuously substitutes a fraction
of such debt with newly issued bonds. Therefore the rate of substitution is
m = F/T . The debt also pays a continuous coupon equal to C.
A default happens whenever the process V u reaches the barrier VB. Opposite
to the Merton’s model, the threshold VB is not exogenous but it is determined
by the smooth-pasting condition
∂S
∂V u
∣∣∣∣
V u=VB
= 0 (25)
This condition drives the choice of the company, which is free to choose at
any instant in time whether to default or not on its obligations.
Furthermore, a default event is now possible at any time during the life of
the company and not only at debt maturity. Leland and Toft [1996] compute
the optimal endogenous threshold VB as
VB =
C
r
( A
rT −B
)− AFrT − τCxr
1+αx− (1−α)B (26)
where
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• A =2ae−rTN
(
aσ
√
T
)
−2zN
(
zσ
√
T
)
− 2
σ
√
T
n
(
zσ
√
T
)
+
2e−rT
σ
√
T
n
(
aσ
√
T
)
+(z−a)
• B =−
(
2z+
2
zσ2T
)
N
(
zσ
√
T
)
− 2
σ
√
T
n
(
zσ
√
T
)
+(z−a)+ 1
zσ2T
• a = r−δ−σ2/2σ2
• z = (a
2σ4+2rσ2)
1/2
σ2
• x = a+ z
• N (·) is the standard normal cdf
• n(·) is the standard normal pdf
• τ is the corporate tax rate
The market value of debt can be shown to be equal to
D =
C
r
+
(
F−C
r
)(
1− e−rT
rT
− I (T )
)
+
(
(1−α)VB−Cr
)
J (T ) (27)
where
• I (T ) = 1rT
(
G(T )− e−rTF (T ))
• J (T ) = 1
zσ
√
T
[
−
(
V u
VB
)−a+z
N (q1 (t))q1 (t)+
(
V u
VB
)−a−z
N (q2 (t))q2 (t)
]
• F (t) = N (h1 (t))+
(
V u
VB
)−2a
N (h2 (t))
• G(t) =
(
V u
VB
)−a+z
N (q1 (t))+
(
V u
VB
)−a−z
N (q2 (t))
• h1 (t) = −b−aσ2tσ√t
• h2 (t) = −b+aσ2tσ√t
• q1 (t) = −b−zσ2tσ√t
• q2 (t) = −b+zσ2tσ√t
• b = log
(
V u
VB
)
In the expression for the market value of debt, we can identify three compo-
nents. The first element is the value of debt that comes from the present value
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of all future coupons, the second part comes from the future reimbursement
of principal and the last part from the expected recovery rate in the event of
default.
We now want to compute the levered value of assets, that is
V =V u +TS−DC (28)
where TS indicates the tax savings from debt and DC the costs of default.
From Leland [1994] the explicit expression of this last equation becomes
V =V u +
τC
r
(
1−
(
V
VB
)−x)
−αVB
(
V
VB
)−x
(29)
Finally, the value of equity is given by
S =V −D (30)
which maps the unobserved value of assets V into the observed equity price
S.
A.5 Leland [2006] Model
The most recent literature tries to combine the endogeneity of default events
with the richest possible jump structure. The most important results in this
direction have been obtained for instance by Hilberink and Rogers [2002],
Leland [2006] and Chen and Kou [2009].
The model we implement here is Leland [2006], which is very similar to
Leland and Toft [1996] with the only inclusion of a jump component in the
unlevered firm value {V ut }∞t=1. Only jumps with deterministic size k ∈ [0,1]
are allowed. k is such that in the event of a jump the company defaults. The
diffusion component is a geometric brownian motion with a drift compensated
for the presence of jumps in such a way that the expected instantaneous
return is still E (dV u/V u) = (r−δ)dt.
In particular, V u solves the following SDE
dV u
V u
=
{
(r−δ+λk)dt +σdZ with probability (1−λdt)
−k with probability (λdt)
where λ is the jump-to-default intensity parameter.
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In this simplified jump-diffusion framework jumps are rare events that
immediately drive the firm to bankruptcy. Of course, defaults can still
occur also as a consequence of the diffusion process and in absence of
jumps. This choice is also justified by the empirical evidence, accord-
ing to which an abrupt jump to default is quite a rare event (See e.g.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege [2003]).
It is also assumed that the maturity of the debt is infinity but it is continuously
repaid at a proportional rate m. This means that the average maturity of the
outstanding debt is T =
∫ ∞
0 t (me
−mt)dt = 1/m. The model can also include
default costs equal to α. Repaid debt is continuously replaced by new issues
with the same characteristics as the retired ones.
The company optimally decides the value VB of the asset process that triggers
the default event. In particular VB is the value of the assets that satisfies the
smooth-pasting condition
∂S
∂V u
∣∣∣∣
V u=VB
= 0 (31)
which can be proved to be
VB =
(C+mF)y(z1)
z1
+ λ(1−k)Vy(z2)z2 −
τCy(z3)
z3
1+(1−α)y(z1)+αy(z3) (32)
where
• y(z) = (g−(1/2)σ
2)+
(
(g−(1/2)σ2)2+2zσ2
)0.5
σ2
• z1 = r+m+λ
• z2 = z1−g
• g = r−δ+λk
• z3 = r+λ
Therefore, as in Leland and Toft [1996], a default can occur whenever VB is
reached and therefore at any time before the maturity of the debt.
It is possible to show that the value of the debt is equal to the sum of
three components: the debt value conditional on no default, the debt value
conditional on diffusion to default and the debt value conditional on jump to
default. Therefore
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D =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
e−mt (C+mP)
]
(1−F (t))e−λtdt
+
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
e−mt (1−α)VB
]
f (t)e−λtdt
+
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
e−mt (1− k)egtV ](1−F (t))e−λtdt (33)
where F (t) and f (t) are, respectively, the cumulative distribution function
and the probability density function of the first passage time of the process
V u to VB.
Solving the three integrals (see Leland [1994]) we get the market value of
debt
D =
C+mF
z1
(
1−
(
V u
VB
)−y(z1))
+(1−α)VB
(
V u
VB
)−y(z1)
+
λ(1− k)V u
z2
(
1−
(
V u
VB
)−y(z2))
(34)
The next step is to consider the tax savings from debt (TS) and the default
costs (DC). Taking these elements into consideration, we can find, in analogy
with the Leland and Toft [1996] model, the levered value of the asset process,
which is
V =V u +TS−DC (35)
where
• TS = τCr+λ
(
1−
(
V u
VB
)−y(z3))
• DC = αVB
(
V u
VB
)−y(z3)
• z3 = r+λ
Finally, the value of equity is given by
S =V −D (36)
This is the mapping from assets to equity we are looking for.
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In this work we implement a filtering technique and therefore we explicitly
estimate the latent asset value process. In the original work by Leland
[2006] the actual estimate of the latent process V is not performed and a
simple estimate of the price of debt, and consequently the assessment of
the ability of the model to explain the observed term structure of corporate
spreads, is performed. The original work by Leland [2006] also introduces an
exogenously determined liquidity premium of 60 bps. In our case we ignore
this, since we are working with CDS, a synthetic instrument, and not with
corporate bonds, which are subject to stronger liquidity issues.
90
B Unscented Kalman Filter
If the functions f and h of the state space model in equations (6) and (7) are
linear then the universally accepted estimation technique for the problem is
the Kalman filter. In our case, however, the function f is actually assumed
to be linear but unfortunately h is not. Therefore a more sophisticated
estimation technique is required.
We can identify at least two big families of algorithms that solve our problem.
The first one tries to linearize the function h around the current value of
the state vector Xt . This is usually done through a Taylor approximation
arrested at the first order. This family of methods is usually called Extended
Kalman Filter.
A second family of techniques does not try to approximate the function h
but rather the transition density function of the state vector. A consequence
of this is that the entire approximation procedure is derivative-free. The
approximation is carried out by simulating a set of points χi (called σ-points).
To each of these points a weight wi is assigned according to the likelihood
of the simulated values. The set of all the couples {χi,wi} approximates the
pdf of the states. This technique is usually called Unscented Kalman Filter
(UKF) and can be summarized in the following steps. For a more detailed
presentation see e.g. Simandl [2006] or Bar-Shalom, Li, and Kirubarajan
[2001].
Step 1
The first step in the UKF algorithm is the definition of an initial state vector x0
with known mean µ0 =E [x0] and known covariance P0 =E
[
(x0−µ0)(x0−µ0)′
]
.
Step 2
We then define the first set of σ-points χk−1 and their corresponding weights
as
χ0 = µ0; w0 =
ξ
n+ξ
χi = µ0 +
(√
(n+ξ)P0
)
i
; wi =
1
2(n+ξ)
χ j = µ0−
(√
(n+ξ)P0
)
j−n
; w j =
1
2(n+ξ)
(37)
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for i = 1, ...,n and j = n+1, ...,2n and where the i or j index represents the
ith or jth column of the matrix
√
(n+ξ)P0. ξ is a scaling parameter which
determines the dispersion of the σ-points around their mean and is function of
three other constants. We select these constants, and consequently ξ, accord-
ing to the most frequent choice in the literature (see e.g. Wan and der Merwe
[2000] for a detailed discussion of the choice).
Step 3
After that we apply the measurement function h(·) and get a set of simulated
observable variables
Zk = hk (χk) (38)
We use these points and the corresponding weights to estimate the predictive
statistics of the measurement variables
• zˆk, the average of the measurement
• Pz,k, the covariance matrix of the points Zk
• Pxz,k, the covariance between the points χk and Zk
Step 4
Analogously to the standard Kalman gain step, we update the state estimate
with the last measurement zk
xˆ = xˆ+Kk (zk− zˆk)
Pk = Pk−KkPz,kK′k (39)
(40)
with Kk = Pxz,k (Pz,k)
−1
Step 5
We then define a new vector of sigma points as
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χ0,k = xˆk; w0 =
ξ
n+ξ
χi,k = xˆk +
(√
(n+ξ)Pk
)
i
; wi =
1
2(n+ξ)
χ j,k = xˆk−
(√
(n+ξ)Pk
)
j−n
; w j =
1
2(n+ξ)
(41)
with this new set of σ-points we set k = k+ 1 and go back to step 3. We
repeat until k = n.
Of course, if the parameters of equation (8) are unknown and need to be
estimated, we have to consider them as unknown states and therefore they
have to be added to the vector of states X . This is the case of our problem,
since we do not know the value of the parameters in the transition matrix A
of equation (8).
It is possible to implement also another and more efficient procedure, the
so-called Square-Root UKF. The algorithm is very similar to the presented
one, the only difference is that we do not propagate the covariance matrix Px
but its Cholesky decomposition Sk with Pk = SkS′k.
It is interesting to notice that this method does not involve any type of
numerical inversion of the functions f or h. This completely eliminates
numerical issues due to the numerical search of the zeros of the functions.
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Liquidity and limits of arbitrage in structural credit
risk models. ∗
Matteo Borghi †
Abstract
In this paper we assess the performances of structural credit risk
models in explaining corporate bond spread variations. We confirm
that the explanatory power is in general low but it increases when
the observational frequency is reduced, supporting the claim that a
transitory noise is present and affects the performances of structural
models. We confirm this by verifying that the errors left by structural
models significantly depend on standard liquidity indicators, from
equity and bond market. We finally claim that the variability left in
the residuals left by both structural models and liquidity indicators
can be considered as a measure of limits of arbitrage and verify that it
actually depends on global indicators of market frictions such as the
TED spread or the LiborOIS.
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1 Introduction
Structural credit risk models are well known and widely investigated in
finance since the seminal works by Black and Scholes [1973] and Merton
[1974]. The basic idea is the use of contingent claim pricing theory for the
valuation of corporate liabilities. According to this approach, equity and
debt are seen as derivative contracts written on the unobserved assets of the
company and can be priced accordingly. Due to the limited liability rule, for
instance, equity can be interpreted as a long call option written on the assets
while debt is equivalent to a certain amount of risk-free bonds plus a short
position in a put option on the assets.
Different structural credit risk models have postulated different stochastic
processes for the evolution of the unobserved asset values and different
characteristics of equity and debt in terms of maturity, generated cash
flows and seniority. The original assumption of geometric Brownian motion
for the evolution of the market value of assets has been substituted by
other hypotheses, including processes with non-continuous trajectories and
the presence of jumps. Also the presence of a fixed debt maturity and
the possibility to default only at that time, originally present in this type
of models, has been replaced by more realistic assumptions, such as the
possibility to default before maturity. An improvement has been obtained
also for the contract characteristics of debt. The original hypothesis of bullet
zero-coupon reimbursement, for instance, has been replaced by the more
flexible assumption of continuous rolling of the debt during the entire life of
the company.
Finally, the exogeneity of the default threshold, given only by the face value
of the outstanding debt, has been replaced by an endogenously determined
threshold and a framework in which the company optimally and continuously
decides whether to default or not. Consequently many different pricing
formulae have been proposed for corporate equity and debt, one for every
model specification.
Several tests have been carried out in order to verify the performances
of structural models in the prediction of corporate spreads. One of the
first is Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld [1984] and another fundamental one
Eom, Helwege, and Huang [2004]. A common result of such tests is the
substantial inability of structural models to explain observed credit spreads
and in particular the general underestimation of observed credit spreads when
calibrated on historical equity prices and volatilities. For some models, also
an overestimation of the spreads is observed and in general the performances
of structural credit risk models are found to be poor. In the literature, such
failure is commonly referred to as “credit spread puzzle”, since it appears in
striking contrast with the conceptual soundness, elegance and plausibility of
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the considered models.
A first motivation of this work is a new extensive and model-free test of
structural models based on one of the largest available datasets of real
transaction corporate bond prices. We claim the test to be model-free since
we do not impose a particular pricing form for equity and debt but we simply
test a linear dependency, compatible with a generic first order approximation.
In other words, we are not testing if, for instance, the Merton’s model works
but simply if the relevant state variables proposed in the model (namely equity
price and equity volatility) have an impact on debt pricing. The considered
period appears particularly interesting since it includes a relatively stable
period of financial markets before the crisis and the recent stressed period.
A second motivation is the investigation of the reasons for the failure of
structural models. We argue that the reasons are primarily large and per-
sistent imperfections in equity and debt markets. We verify that the errors
made by structural models can partly be justified by the most commonly
used liquidity indicators, which are able to explain a non-negligible part
of the residuals left by structural models. We can argue that the role of
illiquidity mainly comes from the credit market, which is characterized by
worst liquidity conditions with respect to the equity market (see section 5.1.2
for an heuristic confirmation of this) but a rigorous proof of this conjecture
appears more difficult. This finding substantially confirms the results in
Barone-Adesi and Borghi [2012], where the removal of observational noise for
the estimation of the unobserved assets were achieved by nonlinear filtering
and the improvement on standard inversion techniques, even if not extreme,
was documented.
We finally verify that the variability left in the residuals after removing
also liquidity friction proxies strongly depends on market-wide indicators
of trading frictions or global liquidity conditions. This finding supports the
claim according to which liquidity frictions and limits of arbitrage contribute
to the poor performances of structural credit risk models.
The current work focuses on the assessment of the performances of structural
credit risk models in explaining the variability in credit spreads. The credit
spread puzzle originates looking at the performances of such models in
explaining the levels of spreads. On the other hand, good performances of
structural models have been documented (see e.g. Shaefer and Strebulaev
[2008]) in the prediction of hedge ratios of corporate bonds in terms of equity.
We can argue that the error in levels can be a consequence of the risk aversion
of agents on the market. In particular, the main factors that can explain the
evidence are the following. The first is the presence of illiquidity risk premia
required for buying corporate bonds (a typically illiquid asset class, see section
5.1.2). This will increase the expected returns and consequently spreads on
such securities by a component that cannot be justified by the information
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present in the corporate structure of the company. The second type of risk
premium is required because the non-arbitrage relationships between the
prices of corporate liabilities are enforced by strategies that in general are not
risk-free (see below) and therefore require a premium. A third reason is that
the mentioned convergence strategies are based on contracts (e.g. Repos) that
may involve counterparty risk and therefore require an additional premium.
Another argument (proposed by Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann [2001])
is that the observed difference in spreads can be generated by different
taxation between corporate and government bonds. A last possible reason is
that a remuneration for systematic undiversifiable risk is present in corporate
bond yields. A less clear theoretical explanation is available for the poor
performance of the model in explaining the variability of credit spreads and
here we concentrate in this topic.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing
literature concerning structural models, their testing and the impacts of
liquidity and limits of arbitrage issues on market pricing. In section 3 we
describe the theoretical framework behind structural models and how liquidity
deterioration and limits of arbitrage can affect their performances. In section
4 we describe the dataset used for our analysis while in section 5 we present
how the analysis is performed and the results obtained. Section 6 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
This paper mainly draws on three streams of literature. The first one is
the classical literature about structural credit risk models and the related
empirical tests, the second is related to liquidity indicators and the last one
is about limits of arbitrage.
Beyond the already mentioned works by Black and Scholes [1973] and Merton
[1974], the evolution of structural credit risk models can be represented by
five main steps of development. The first is the work by Black and Cox
[1976], where the hypothesis to default only at the maturity of the debt
is removed and default at any time is allowed through the use of barrier
instead of plain vanilla options to model corporate liabilities. A second
step is Brennan and Schwartz [1978], where the role of corporate taxation
in the valuation of equity and debt is taken into account. A third step
in this evolution is represented by the introduction of stochastic interest
rates, which is presented for the first time by Ronn and Verma [1986]. The
final two major improvements in this field are due to Leland [1994], where
the exogenous default barrier is replaced by a threshold optimally and
endogenously determined by the company, and Leland [2006], where the
optimally selected default point is combined with the presence of jumps in
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the stochastic evolution of asset values.
As far as empirical tests are concerned, we can find the first articles at the
beginning of the ’80s with the works by Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld [1983],
where the the performances of the models are for the first time questioned. A
common finding is that structural models are underestimating observed bond
spreads and that the error is particularly large for high-rated companies. The
works by Ogden [1987] and Lyden and Saraniti [2000] further investigate the
question and identify a large underestimation of spreads, between 90 and
105 bps. Elton et al. [2001] confirm these results and identify in the different
taxation on corporate and government bonds another determinant of the
underestimation of spreads and propose that the remaining unexplained
part of the spreads is a remuneration for systematic risk, dependent on the
Fama and French [1992] factors.
Also more recent works, such as Huang and Huang [2003], confirm the diffi-
culties of the models in the explanation of corporate spreads. On average,
they are able to explain less than the 30% of spread levels. The unexplained
component is identified with a “liquidity” factor. Eom et al. [2004] confirm
the underestimation of spreads for the majority of structural models but
for some of them (e.g. Longstaff and Schwartz [1995] and Leland and Toft
[1996]) an overestimation is actually identified. Large errors are in any case
documented.
A final paper worth mentioning is Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein [2001]. This
work is quite in line with this paper and tries to explain the changes in bond
spreads by means of structural variables. The main innovations we are
proposing with respect to this piece of work are the following: the use of
actual transaction data instead of market makers’ quotes, the use of company-
specific structural variables instead of market indexes for equity and volatility,
the use of company specific liquidity indicators for equity and bonds and
finally the relationship with limits of arbitrage. The use of company-specific
structural variables allows us to obtain a better fit to spread changes but
the poor performances of structural models is generally confirmed.
The literature related to liquidity indicators is in general designed for the
equity market, which is mainly based on established exchange trades and
therefore provides rich information about transaction prices and volumes.
The corporate bond market is mainly OTC and therefore less data is usually
available. However, provided that specific information about single trans-
actions is available, one can easily extend the equity literature to credit
market. Many liquidity indicators have been proposed in the literature
(see Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka [2009] for a nice review). Apart from
intuitive indicators such as the number of trades, here we are concentrating
on the one proposed by Amihud [2002].
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The theory of limits of arbitrage is investigated in many articles, which
date back to the ’90s. One of the most important works in this field is
Shleifer and Vishny [1997]. In this article, the classical assumptions about
riskless and costless arbitrage strategies are removed and it is shown that in
the real world an arbitrage strategy entails upfront costs from the arbitrageur
and is not in general free of risk. The presence of a limited number of
professional arbitrageurs working under an agency relationship with investors
is also shown to generate, in crisis periods, strong deleveraging pressures on
funds, which are forced to close their arbitrage strategies before the prices
return to equilibrium.
The financial constraints affecting arbitrageurs are also discussed in
Gromb and Vayanos [2002]. Here a model is proposed for such agents and it
is shown that, in some circumstances, arbitrageurs can fail to act optimally
and consequently the market can be allocatively inefficient and prices out of
equilibrium can persist.
The impact that agency relationships between investors and arbitrageurs
have on limits of arbitrage is also investigated in Acharya and Viswanathan
[2011]. The model proposed in the article explains changes in market liquidity
due to agency relationships and formalizes the deleveraging process of funds
and financial institutions observed in stressed periods.
The amplification of price changes due to the unwinding of positions operated
by intermediaries is also modeled in and Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009].
In this framework, the behaviours of liquidity conditions and their impacts
on limits of arbitrage are also captured by the model. For a more detailed
review of the literature and an alternative model, see Gromb and Vayanos
[2010].
We contribute to the existing literature by performing a wide test on the
performance of structural credit risk models in the pricing of corporate bonds
based on more than 4.000 securities for which we are able to obtain implied
volatilities, bond and equity prices.
In a second step we investigate the errors of structural models and clearly
identify a role of liquidity indicators in their explanation. A role of limits of
arbitrage in the explanation of errors is also identified.
3 Theoretical framework
Structural credit risk models assume that the default of a company happens
when the unobserved market value of its assets V falls below a certain
threshold.
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In the first and simplest model, Merton [1974], the capital structure of the
company is extremely simple and consists only in equity and a zero-coupon
bond with maturity T and face value F, whose current market value is
D = Fe−yT , where y is the appropriate yield-to-maturity. The assets of the
company follow a geometric Brownian motion and the default can happen
only at maturity T . The default event takes places when the market value of
assets at maturity (VT ) is smaller than the face value of debt (i.e. VT < F).
Consequently, the value of equity at maturity is max(VT −F ;0), which is
exactly the payoff of a call option written on the assets of the company with
strike equal to the face value of the debt. The payoff of debt at maturity
is therefore min(F ;VT ), which can be expressed as the payoff of a short put
option on company’s assets plus some risk-free debt. Consequently, and by
non arbitrage, also the values today of debt and equity can be expressed
using call and put option prices.
In this simple case, the default threshold is just given by the face value
of liabilities while in other more sophisticated models the threshold can
be a more complicated function of company parameters and can be even
endogenously determined (see e.g. Leland [2006]).
In general, all structural credit risk models are able to express the market
value and volatility of equity as increasing functions of the unobserved market
value and volatility of assets, possibly contaminated by observational (e.g.
trading) noise. Defining St and σSt the equity price and equity volatility at
time t, respectively, we can write
St = h1
(
Vt ,σVt ,ψt
)
+ ε1,t
σSt = h2
(
Vt ,σVt ,ψt
)
+ ε2,t (1)
where σVt is the asset volatility and ψt is a vector of exogenous parameters
such as the risk-free interest rate, the maturity of the debt, etc.
In the simplest Merton’s case, h1 is just the Black-Scholes price of a call
and h2 can be recovered by a straightforward application of Ito’s lemma
and is σS = ∂S∂V
V
S σ
V . εi,t , i = 1,2 are the white noise residuals. An obvious
consequence of system (1) is that also the market value D of debt can be
expressed as a function of asset value and volatility, i.e.
Dt = h3
(
Vt ,σVt ,ψt
)
+ηt (2)
where ηt is again white noise and, in Merton’s case, h3 is equal to a constant
minus the Black-Scholes price of a put. The function h3 in equation (2) is
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still increasing in Vt but decreasing in σV , since the debt is equal to a short
position in a put on the assets.
Under invertibility of functions h1 and h2, or equivalently if the nonlinear
system (1) admits a unique solution in V and σV , then it is possible to express
the market value of debt as
Dt = g
(
St ,σSt ,ψt
)
+ηt (3)
where the function g is increasing in St and decreasing in σSt .
Different structural credit risk models postulate different functions h and
g but must share the same signs in the dependency of debt on equity and
equity volatility.
From equation (3) we deduce that, in a frictionless market, the relationship
between corporate bond and the corresponding equity returns should hold
by non-arbitrage. When the equity of a company is relatively overpriced (un-
derpriced) with respect to the corresponding corporate bonds, an arbitrageur
can take advantage of the situation by short selling (buying) the equity and
buying (selling) the bond.
Of course, some limitations to this theoretical framework are induced by the
complex capital structure of real-world firms, where there are many different
types of shares (ordinary, non-voting, redeemable, management, etc) and a
much more complicated debt structure (loans, bonds, hybrid instruments
with many different characteristics in terms of maturity, coupon, seniority
and privileges) is present.
Furthermore, practical limitations to the achievement of the theoretical
equilibrium between the prices of corporate liabilities may be caused by the
factors mentioned in the introduction, that is
• Liquidity risk premia
• Premia to remunerate risky arbitrage
• Counterparty risk
• Different taxation for government and corporates
• Remuneration of systematic risk in corporate bonds
Such forces, affecting the levels of spreads together with liquidity constraints
or the presence of limits to arbitrage forces may transform a theoretically
risk- and cost-free arbitrage into a risky and expensive (at least upfront)
strategy.
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3.1 Liquidity
The possibility to exploit an arbitrage opportunity clearly depends on the
liquidity conditions of the considered markets (equity and corporate bonds
in this case). An arbitrage opportunity may be theoretically present but the
volume traded on at least one of the two markets may be so small that a
practical implementation becomes impossible. Similarly, the bid-ask spread
for the securities may be so large that the theoretical arbitrage opportunity
vanishes in the practical implementation. A strictly related aspect is the price
impact of a unitary trade in a market. If the market is very thin a theoretical
arbitrage opportunity may disappear when an agent tries to exploit it and
negotiates a relatively large volume. All such liquidity conditions are market
specific and can be measured by the indicators described below.
The choice to use the TRACE database, which reports the transaction
volumes trade by trade, and the CRSP database, which includes the daily
traded volume of each security, allows us to build powerful indicators of the
liquidity in the market and therefore to verify if these measures are able to
explain the deviations from the equilibrium postulated by structural models.
We are implementing a set of liquidity indicators to explain the errors in
structural credit risk models.
A first simple and intuitive indicator of liquidity is the number of trades of
every bond in a given time period.
Another useful (il)liquidity indicator is the one proposed by Amihud [2002]
and given by
Illiqi,t =
1
n
n
∑
j=1
∣∣ri, j∣∣
Voli, j
(4)
where
• n is the number of trades observed in the period on which the measure
is computed
• ri, j is the return of security i generated by trade j
• Voli, j is the volume of security i in trade j.
The index can be interpreted as the impact of a unitary transaction on the
absolute return of the security. In the case of very liquid securities, also large
traded volumes have small impacts on the absolute return and the illiquidity
index will therefore be close to zero. For illiquid securities, on the other
hand, even small traded volumes have a large impact on the realized returns,
which translates into a large Illiq index.
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We are able to compute the index for both equity and bonds. In the first
case, we are able to compute the original index proposed by Amihud [2002],
i.e. based on transaction-by-transaction data. In the case of equities, on the
other hand, transaction-level data are not available in CRSP, and we are
therefore forced to rely on daily returns and volumes, which may reduce the
effectiveness in the assessment of liquidity conditions.
We also propose a“systematic Amihud” index, computed, for every considered
period, as the cross-section average of the single bond-specific Amihud
measures. This last computation is performed by trimming the 2.5% extreme
observations on each side of the distribution. This is justified by the presence
of a small number of outliers characterized by extremely small traded volumes,
which may bring the index to infinity and therefore affect the reliability of
the estimation. The evolution of the index is in figure 1. The illiquidity spike
that started in 2007 is evident and during the worst phases of the crisis a 1
mln trade could have had a price impact almost equal to 9%. This seems
particularly relevant when we consider that this is the average impact of a
trade. During the peak of the crisis, 4.81% of 1 million trades could have
generated returns above 20% and 3.02% even larger than 40%. Starting from
the second half of 2009 the liquidity conditions, measured in terms of price
impacts, are in general very good, and even better than during the pre-crisis
period.
We are excluding the indicator proposed by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka
[1999] because their measure comes from the estimation of a full market model
for the behaviours of investors, able to explain different liquidity conditions
in the market and this may introduce too much structure in the estimation.
We also tried to implement the implicit bid-ask spread proposed by Roll
[1984], who relates the measure to the observed first-order autocovariance
of returns computed trade-by-trade. The reason for the exclusion is that
the observed autocovariance is actually zero or negative in a non-negligible
number of observations, which makes impossible the use of the indicator. A
possible reason of this behaviour is that the first hypothesis of the model,
i.e. the informational efficiency of the market, does not hold. Another
widely used liquidity indicator is the one proposed in Pastor and Stambaugh
[2003], which consists in the coefficient of a regression of returns separately
performed every month and tries to measure the reverse of the previous day
order flow shock. We do not implement such indicator since it is available
only on relatively low frequencies (typically monthly) in order to estimate
the regression in a reliable way, while in our work we take into consideration
also higher frequencies.
An important work with a specific focus on corporate bond market liquidity
is Dick-Nielsen, Feldutter, and Lando [2012]. Here a new liquidity indicator
is proposed and is essentially a linear combination of the most important
108
liquidity measures used in this study. Since the new factor is statistically
built in a principal component framework, its specification can vary over
time and is in general different if estimated in two different dates. In order to
avoid such time inconsistency and to reduce the loss of information coming
from the concentration of several indicators into one, we just consider as
inputs the original and most important liquidity measures.
The described liquidity indicators are strictly linked to the market in which
they are measured (equity and bond in this case) and are in general strongly
influenced by the traded volume of a security. Other limits of arbitrage can
originate outside equity and bond markets and therefore cannot be captured
by the proposed indicators. Such events are described in the next section.
3.2 Limits of Arbitrage
It is known at least since the work by Shleifer and Vishny [1997] that the
existence of a fully risk-free and costless arbitrage is extremely rare since
many frictions are present and strongly limit arbitrage opportunities.
The entire theory behind structural credit risk models is actually based on
the presence of arbitrage forces that keep the market value of assets and all
types of liabilities in equilibrium. The typical convergence trading strategies
that should guarantee the equilibrium between equity and corporate bond
prices and returns are long-short strategies. Such strategies, in their practical
implementation, require an initial amount of cash needed to enter into repo
and reverse-repo contracts.
In particular, the logical schemes of the arbitrage strategies are represented in
figures 2 and 3. Let’s suppose that the bond of a company is underpriced with
respect to the corresponding equity. In this case the arbitrageur would buy
the underpriced bond and sell the equity (for simplicity, we don’t represent
a third position, required in a risk-free bond). Clearly, the arbitrageur in
general does not hold the equity and therefore needs to enter into a reverse
repo contract (right-hand side of the picture). If we assume that the cash
flows from buying the bond and selling the equity are equal, it is clear that
the repo contract has to be financed with new cash. This is usually achieved
via a repo contract in which the bonds just bought are pledged as collateral.
Both the repo and reverse repo contracts entered include some haircuts. In
the repo, the amount received versus the pledged bond is less than its market
value in order to protect the counterparty from a sudden decrease of the
bond price realized before a margin call for new collateral can be fulfilled. In
the reverse repo contract, the market value of equity is less than the cash
provided as collateral in order to protect the counterparty from a sudden
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increase in equity price, realized before a margin call for new cash can be
completed.
Two types of repos are usually available: the overnight and the term repo.
The first is the most frequently used and is particularly common in the north
American market. It needs to be rolled over every day until the strategy
results in the expected profits. Commonly, no margin call is required due
to the short life of the contract. Since the contract needs to be rolled over
every day, also the cash required to finance the haircuts need to be found
every day. The second type of contract is characterized by a longer horizon
(usually two weeks). In this case no daily roll-over is required but if the
underlying asset price moves in the adverse direction a possible margin call
for new collateral might take place. In both cases, cash has to be provided
upfront and possibly during the entire life of the strategy. Such money should
come from the equity of the arbitrageur or needs to be financed on the debt
market. In particularly stressed periods, the possibility to find such resources
might become extremely expensive or even impossible. This means that the
possibility to implement a convergence strategy crucially depends on the
liquidity conditions of the interbank market. If such market dries up, strong
limitations to convergence strategies may appear.
A second possible limitation to the mentioned strategies can derive from the
slow convergence between the prices of the considered securities. We can
assume that in the long run the price of bonds and equities can converge
to equilibrium but there is no guarantee about the time in which such
convergence will happen and in the short run the divergence may even
increase indefinitely. In practice, arbitrageurs are usually large fund managers
that are subject to funding constraints and that are in an agency relationship
with investors. If they implement a convergence strategy but in the short
run the underlying securities diverge even more from their equilibrium a loss
is realized by the fund. The investors may rationally believe that the loss is a
consequence of the poor skills of fund managers and may therefore withdrawn
their funds. As a consequence of this decision, fund managers are forced
to close their convergence strategies, which makes the divergence between
prices even larger. This phenomenon may also be amplified by an increased
risk aversion of investors, which may want to close their investments in risky
assets and concentrate more funds in cash-like investments.
A reduced liquidity in the interbank market, an increased deleveraging
pressure on arbitrage funds from investors together with an increased risk
aversion may therefore seriously reduce the effectiveness of capital structure
arbitrage and therefore reduce the performances of structural credit risk
models, which are based on the assumption of equilibrium between the market
values of assets and all types of liabilities.
It is also useful to notice that in periods of extreme financial stress, such as
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the last financial crisis, all the three mentioned characteristics are present
and therefore we can theoretically expect a worst performance of structural
credit risk models.
4 Description of the Data
The first component of our data set is the TRACE (Trade Reporting and
Compliance Engine) database. This database has been introduced in July
2002 by FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) and includes
over 65 million OTC transaction data for corporate bonds exchanged on
the North American market in the period 2002-2011. The total number of
traded bond issues is 71.000 but we are able to safely assign issue-specific
characteristics (maturity, coupon, etc.) to only 24.475. The corresponding
number of issuer entities is 5.198.
We take equity data from the University of Chicago Center for Research in
Securities Prices (CRSP). We rely on the daily security master file, which
includes more than 10.000 companies for the period from September 2000
to December 2011. We are using three fields from this database: the stock
price (PRC), the conversion factor for equity price (CFACPR) accounting
for stock splits and other corporate actions and finally the volume traded
per day.
Implied volatility data is taken from Ivy Optionmetrics Database, which
includes over 55.000 options over the period 2001-2011. We use the volatilities
implied in the longest available maturities (730 day) taking the average over
all strikes for both calls and puts.
The intersection between the 3 databases is performed using the CUSIP code,
whose first six digits univocally define the issuer of any security. In the final
dataset we managed to collect 596.757 observations with weekly frequency.
Given the fact that TRACE observations are trade-by-trade and that more
than one trade per day can take place, the data we are using in our analysis
is an average of all the observed trades weighted on the volume of each trade.
A final input are the term structures of risk-free interest rates. We use
for this purpose the zero curve computed by Datastream for all maturities
between one month and fifty years. The considered bonds are denominated
in four currencies: USD, EUR, GBP and CAD and therefore we use the
corresponding four risk-free curves. Nevertheless, given the fact that the
TRACE database is based on US transactions, we notice that the vast
majority of bonds are denominated in USD, and only few issues are in the
other 3 currencies.
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In table 1 we present the distribution of the observed bond prices according
to their rating.
Rating %
AAA 0.78%
AA+ 0.32%
AA 2.37%
AA- 4.14%
A+ 7.49%
A 13.44%
A- 9.84%
BBB+ 10.95%
BBB 14.69%
BBB- 10.19%
BB+ 3.79%
BB 5.19%
BB- 5.41%
B+ 3.25%
B 2.01%
B- 1.34%
CCC+ 0.54%
CCC 0.2%
CCC- 0.01%
CC 0.04%
Defaulted 0.01%
NR 3.98%
Table 1: Distribution per rating of the weekly observations
The time frequency we are using is both weekly and monthly. We use both
the last observation of every week and a weekly average. In the first case, we
identify the last trading day of a specific bond and look for the equity price
and implied volatility at that specific day. In a second dataset we just use
weekly averages of bond prices, equity prices and implied volatilities. The use
of point observations has the advantage of using all the available information
at a certain time without the effects of old data. The use of weekly averages,
on the other hands, has the advantage to potentially reduce some noise
present in our database of bond transactions. We present both results but
their differences are not particularly relevant. For the monthly frequency, we
take the last observed price of every month and the corresponding equity
prices and implied volatilities at that specific date.
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5 Empirical Analysis
Consistently with the literature (see e.g.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin [2001]), we test spread differ-
ences and not levels. This is also justified by the characteristics of credit
spreads, very close to non stationary unit roots, which may induce spurious
results in the regression analysis we are performing
The first step of our analysis is the assessment of the performances of struc-
tural credit risk models in the explanation of price movements in corporate
bonds, which is equivalent to a test of the performances of equation (2). As
explained above, we do not test the exact nonlinear equation in (3) but we
linearize it for a generic structural credit risk model and therefore test
rD,t = α+β1rS,t +β2rσS,t + εt (5)
where rD,t , rS,t and rσS,t are the returns of the risky bond spread, the corre-
sponding equity and implied volatility, respectively.
Many different choices can be made for the measure of credit returns. The
first possibility is to take the excess returns at every observation point, i.e.
rD,t =
(
Pt + It
Pt−1 + It−1
−1
)
−
(
P∗t + I∗t
P∗t−1 + I
∗
t−1
−1
)
(6)
where Pt is the clean price at time t, It is the accrued interest at time t and
P∗t and I∗t are the corresponding quantities for a risk-free bond with the same
characteristics of the risky one.
Another possibility is to directly rely on the changes of the spread, that is
rD,t = (yt − y∗t )−
(
yt−1− y∗t−1
)
= st − st−1 (7)
where yt is the risky yield-to-maturity, y∗t is the risk-free yield-to-maturity
and st is the spread at time t.
Here we rely on the second choice because we are able to obtain the yield-
to-maturity directly from TRACE, while the first choice would require the
computation of the accrued interest It , which needs the exact amount and
ex-date of each coupon. The availability of such data, and ex-coupon dates
in particular, does not appear complete in TRACE.
In our analysis we exclude the impact of the changes in the risk-free term
structure, i.e. we subtract y∗ from equation (7), which is the largest and
most relevant component of risky bond prices. The quantity y∗ can be
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considered as the yield of an hypothetical risk-free bond with exactly the
same characteristics, in terms of maturity and coupon, of the considered
risky security. In this way we are able to specifically model the movements
in excess of the risk-free term structure, which are exactly the ones that can
be explained by structural credit risk models.
The TRACE database provides only the total yield of each bond at each
observation. We use the government term structure of zero interest rates
to compute, given coupon and maturity, the hypothetical yield y∗ described
above.
Furthermore, we have to notice that equation (5) is linear in equity and
volatility while the theoretical equation in (2) is expressed by the function g,
which is in general nonlinear (e.g. the Black-Scholes option price in Merton’s
case). The performed analysis is therefore approximated but gives us two
advantages on the original test based on equation g. The first one is the
reduction in the computational burden of a nonlinear estimation in equation
(5) based on non-analytical functions and the second is the possibility to
universally apply equation (5) to all structural models, independently from
the specific functional form g that defines each model.
Exactly the same procedure is repeated at weekly and monthly frequency. If
the reason for the observed poor performances of structural models comes
from the presence of a non persistent noise, one would expect that the
goodness of fit of equation (5) at lower frequencies improves, since this
different sampling is able to remove the high frequency component of the
noise.
Once equation (5) is estimated, all the variability due to structural changes
in the market value of assets and asset volatility is removed. In other words,
the variability left in the residuals ε of equation (5) cannot be explained by
structural credit risk models and must be originated by some kind of limit
to the arbitrage forces driving the prices to equilibrium.
In this paper we specifically address the role of imperfectly liquid markets.
We therefore try to explain the residuals ε in equation (5), for each corporate
bond, by a set of specific and systematic liquidity indicators. The considered
indicators are in particular
• The Amihud index computed according to section 3.1 for each consid-
ered corporate bond
• The Amihud index computed according to section 3.1 for the equity
corresponding to each considered bond
• A “systematic Amihud” index described above
• The number of trades
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The Amihud indexes for bond and equity appear weakly correlated. Their
linear regression coefficient is only equal to 3.49%. This means that companies
with liquid equity do not necessarily have more liquid bond issues and vice
versa. This seems plausible since the liquidity index is computed issue-by-
issue and a company with liquid equity may have many small illiquid bond
issues.
The illiquidity in the corporate bond market appears more pronounced than
in the equity market. The average Amihud index for equities is equal to only
5 bps while for bonds it reaches 25 bps. This means that, for the considered
sample and period, a trade equal to 1 mln of face value moves the price by 5
bps for equity and 25 for bonds.
The cross-sectional distribution of the Amihud index for bonds is strongly
kurthotic and skewed to the right, indicating that, for some bond, extreme
levels of illiquidity are reached.
In a second step, the equation we are estimating for the assessment of
structural model residuals is
|εt |= γ0 +Xtγ+ηt (8)
where
• γ0 is a scalar parameter
• γ is a vector of parameters
• Xt is the vector of relevant liquidity indicators described above in this
paragraph.
• ηt is a residual
The residuals ε are taken in absolute value since we are interested in the
absolute error of structural models. When markets are very liquid, we expect
residuals to be close to zero but without a specific sign and, on the other
hand, when liquidity conditions are poor we just expect large residuals in
absolute terms but we do not have any a priori expectation about the sign
of the error.
In this way we are able to remove from the residuals ε of structural credit risk
models all the variability explained by adverse liquidity conditions present
in the market. The variability left in the last residuals η can be identified
with the limits of arbitrage different from liquidity frictions such as the ones
described in section 3.2.
As a final step, we look at the absolute residuals η of equation (8) at weekly
frequency, we compute their cross-sectional average and represent its graph in
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figure 4. This indicator is by construction a very general measure of limits of
arbitrage present in the market and different from pure liquidity conditions.
Indeed, in a perfectly frictionless market, the non-arbitrage relationships
between equity and credit should drive residuals ε and, a fortiori, η close to
zero.
It is clear that the strongest limits of arbitrage are present around the
Lehman collapse and in particular between September 2008 and February
2009. It seems reasonable to assume that exactly in this period strong limits
of arbitrage could be generated for instance by relevant outflows from mutual
and hedge funds, which can be considered the most relevant arbitrageurs
in the market. The deleveraging process generated by these redemptions
forced the arbitrageurs to close their convergence strategies between debt
and equity prices and therefore even enlarged the basis between the two.
Furthermore, as explained above, convergence strategies require some cash
upfront to finance repo/reverse repo transactions. The extreme conditions of
the interbank market in that period seem fully compatible with the observed
spike. Also in this case we notice that the general arbitrage conditions in 2010
and 2011 are in general good and comparable to the ones in 2003 and 2004,
implying that in this period capital structure arbitrage is more efficiently
working.
From a more quantitative point of view, we try to explain this index with
two indicators of limits of arbitrage and general liquidity conditions: the
TED and the LiborOIS spreads.
The first is given by the difference between the 3-months libor rate and the
3-months treasury rate. If liquidity in the interbank market decreases, then
the LIBOR rate will increase as the demand of funds overweights the offer.
The impact of such event on the treasury market will be smaller and therefore
the treasury rate will increase less than the libor, widening in this way the
spread. The TED spread is not actually a pure liquidity indicator since it
includes also a relevant counterparty premium. The transactions on the libor
market are between two intermediaries and therefore the exchanged interest
rate needs to include a remuneration for the risk that the counterparty
defaults before the end of the contract.
The second indicator is very similar to the first one and is given by the
difference between the Libor interbank rate and the Overnight Index Swap,
which can be considered as another proxy for the risk-free interest rate. The
equation we are testing is therefore
ArbIdx = δ0 +δ1TEDt +δ2LiborOist +µt (9)
where ArbIdx is the residual index described above, δ0 and δ1 are two
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constants.
5.1 Results
5.1.1 Test of structural credit risk models
The assessment of structural credit risk models is based on the estimation
of equation (5). Both the point estimates and the t-statistics for the coeffi-
cients of such equation are computed following the procedure proposed in
Collin-Dufresne et al. [2001]. According to this method, one separate regres-
sion is performed for every security. In our case, we take into consideration for
the test only securities with more than 20 weekly or 10 monthly observations.
A vector of estimates is therefore obtained for every coefficient. Such vector
includes a very small number of extreme outliers. We deal with this by
removing 0.5% of extreme observations both on the left and on the right of
the distribution and then work with the “clean” vector. The presented point
estimate is the average of all the estimated coefficients. The t-statistic is
obtained using as standard error the sample cross-section standard deviation
of the estimated coefficients rescaled by the square root of the number of
securities.
The estimated coefficients are reported in table 2 for both weekly averages
and weekly point observations.
Weekly Average Weekly Point Obs.
Coef. Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
α 0.0001 13.26 0.0001 8.79
β1 -0.0089 -10.90 -0.0090 -13.61
β2 0.0151 23.22 0.0159 26.53
Table 2: Estimated coefficients in equation (5) for weekly data
The sign of estimated coefficients corresponds to the theoretically predicted
one and the significance is considerable. The coefficient β1 is negative since
an increase in equity prices positively affects the bond price and consequently
lowers the observed spread. On the other hand, an increase in implied
volatilities reduces the value of the debt, which is comparable to a short put
option written on the assets. Consequently the observed credit spreads are
increased.
When we look at the number of bonds characterized by exposure with the
theoretically predicted sign, we observe that the 71.4% of bond spreads has
a negative exposure to the corresponding equity and 82.7% has a positive
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exposure to the volatility implied in its options. Similar results (74.6% and
83.6%, respectively) are obtained with point observations instead of weekly
averages.
It is also worth noting that the impact of implied volatilities on the market
value of debt is more relevant than the impact of equity prices. This appears
justified by the standard option theory. If we consider that the debt is
equivalent to a short put option, the result is equivalent to having vegas
larger than the corresponding deltas in absolute value. For put options, this
is actually the case in most conditions and in particular for high values of
volatility and underlying price with respect to the strike (i.e. put out of the
money). In this case, the market value of equity is positive and therefore the
market value of assets larger than the face value of debt or, equivalently, the
put constituting the debt is out-of-the-money. This is exactly the case in
which (in absolute value) vega is larger than delta.
Alternatively, we also considered the entire sample, without excluding any
extreme datapoint. In this case we looked at the median, a more robust
statistic, instead of the mean. The nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test
has been implemented in place of the standard t-test. This procedure can be
considered as a straightforward extension of the test in Collin-Dufresne et al.
[2001] for the median estimator. The results fully agree with the ones pre-
sented above for the trimmed mean and the three coefficients are statistically
different from zero at all the standard confidence levels.
The R2 of the regressions is substantially small and it is equal to only
14.75% for the weekly average and 16.28% for the weekly point observation.
Furthermore, the intercept is always very strongly different from zero, which
is not theoretically justified, and can be explained by some misspecification of
the model. We can conclude that structural variables, even if significant, are
able to explain only a small part of the total spread variability and confirm
the presence of a “credit spread puzzle” also for spread variability and not
only for their level.
We repeated exactly the same procedure on a monthly time horizon. In this
case we consider only the point observation since the use of averages on such
a long period may be questionable and induce some loss of information. The
results are presented in table 3.
Monthly Point Observation
Coef. Estimate t-stat
α 0.0002 10.5667
β1 -0.0071 -8.0522
β2 0.0204 31.4016
Table 3: Estimated coefficients in equation (5) for monthly data
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The percentage of coefficients characterized by the predicted sign is compara-
ble to the weekly case. In particular, we observe that, for 71.4% of the bonds,
spreads changes have a negative exposure to equity returns and 85.3% has a
positive exposure to the volatility implied in the corresponding options. The
constant is still strongly significant.
It is interesting to note that in this case the R2 of the regression is almost
double with respect to the weekly case and equals 29.36%. This evidence
supports the claim according to which the errors produced by structural
models are generated by a non persistent observational noise. The use of a
lower observational frequency filters out some of the high-frequency noise and
improves the performance of structural models. Such results are compatible
to the ones presented in Collin-Dufresne et al. [2001].
As already said, equation (5) removes all the structural effects from the
changes in corporate spreads. Therefore no structural effect is present
anymore in the residuals ε.
5.1.2 Impact of liquidity indicators
In a second step, we concentrate on the absolute residuals ε from equation
(5), which can be interpreted as errors of structural credit risk models. We
estimate regression (8) based on the previously mentioned indicators. The
coefficients and t-statistics are estimated using the same method described
above and are presented in table 4 for weekly and 5 for monthly data.
Weekly Average Weekly Point Obs.
Variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Constant 0.0009 6.6364 0.0008 6.4929
Amihud Bond 0.0303 2.4050 0.0423 3.3879
Amihud Equity 0.2599 0.5005 0.2537 0.6402
N. Trades 0.0000 0.7795 0.0000 0.9801
Systematic Amihud 0.0745 6.3053 0.0491 5.2296
Table 4: Estimated coefficients in equation (5) for weekly data
It is clear that liquidity indicators, both corporate-specific and systematic,
have a role in the explanation of the structural models residuals. Furthermore,
the estimated coefficients have the theoretically predicted signs. In particular,
Amihud indexes have a positive sign, indicating that when security-specific
illiquidity is high, then the errors of structural models are larger. The fact
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that liquidity conditions in the bond market are statistically significant while
in the equity are not, may support the idea that the scarce liquidity in the
debt market has a major role in preventing convergence trading and other
corporate structure arbitrages with respect to the one in equity markets.
Unexpectedly, the number of trades in the considered period has no impact
on the structural errors since its coefficients are neither statistically nor
economically significant (the sign of the estimate is the opposite of the
theoretically predicted). It is finally interesting to note that the “systematic”
Amihud factor is highly significant, indicating that security-specific liquidity
indicators are not sufficient to explain structural errors and also market-wide
variables are required. The R2 of the regression are 20.26% and 23.46%
in the two weekly cases and 36.99% in the monthly, which indicates that
market liquidity conditions actually have a non-negligible role in explaining
the errors of structural models.
Coef. Estimate t-stat
Constant 0.0012 4.6993
Amihud Bond 0.0358 1.0368
Amihud Equity 0.0184 0.4807
N. Trades 0.0000 0.8081
Systematic Amihud 0.0506 4.7215
Table 5: Estimated coefficients in equation (8) for monthly data
5.1.3 Limits of Arbitrage
The estimated parameters of equation (9) are
Coef. Estimate t-stat
Constant 0.0021 32.7465
TED Spread -0.0002 -1.0673
Libor-OIS 1.89e-05 6.4366
Table 6: Estimated coefficients in equation (9)
The R2 is 29.71%. The coefficient of the TED spread is not economically
significant, since the sign is the opposite of the expected one. This may be
justified by the fact that the Libor-OIS index is very close to the TED and
captures the effect of the latter. Given the fact that in the first part of the
considered period the number of bonds is very small, the proposed index
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appears considerably volatile. A less noisy behaviour is present starting from
2003. If we run regression (9) only from 2003, we get the estimates in table
7.
Coef. Estimate t-stat
Constant 0.0019 43.42
TED Spread 0.0003 2.3069
Libor-OIS 1.36e-05 7.4718
Table 7: Estimated coefficients in equation (9)
The R2 increases in this case to 59.36% and both indicators are statistically
and economically significant. This clearly confirms that limits of arbitrage
and general liquidity conditions have a role in the unsatisfactory performances
of structural Credit risk models.
6 Conclusion
In this paper an empirical test of structural credit risk models is performed.
The quality of the dataset appears high, since it combines actual transaction
prices of corporate bonds taken from TRACE, implied volatilities taken from
Optionmetrics and stock prices taken from CRSP.
The test confirms the poor performances of structural credit risk models
in explaining corporate bond returns (measured in this case by changes in
credit spreads).
We claim that at least part of this unsatisfactory performance can be explained
by the presence of transitory noise in observed volatilities, bond and equity
prices.
A first heuristic support to this proposition comes from the impact of obser-
vational frequency on the performance of structural models. The quality of
the fit decreases with the observational frequency, which means that when
we filter out the high-frequency noise by reducing the sampling frequency,
structural models work better in explaining changes in spreads.
A more accurate test is based on the analysis of the (absolute) residuals
orthogonal to equity and volatility returns. These quantities depend signif-
icantly on some standard liquidity indicators taken from both the equity
and bond market, such as the index proposed by Amihud [2002], and the
variability explained by this measures is not negligible.
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When we look at the behaviour of the average absolute residuals left after
removing also the liquidity component, we notice that they closely resemble
the qualitative pattern of limits of arbitrage present in the period 2001-2011.
Furthermore, such variable significantly depend on standard indicators of
liquidity frictions and limits of arbitrage, such as the TED and LiborOIS
spreads. Even if a relevant part of the variation in credit spreads remains
unexplained, we can conclude that liquidity indicators and limits of arbitrage
have a non-negligible role in this shortcoming.
7 Figures
Figure 1: Evolution of the Systematic Amihud factor
Figure 2: Convergence strategy implemented when bonds are underpriced
with respect to equity
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Figure 3: Convergence strategy implemented when the equity is underpriced
with respect to bonds
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Figure 4: Evolution of the limits of arbitrage measure
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Conclusion
Two major topics are investigated in this work: the presence of a systematic
and an idiosyncratic component in CDS spreads and the investigation of the so
called “credit spread puzzle”.
We verify that a systematic factor (here proxied by the CDX Investment
Grade index) is actually priced in the cross-section of CDS returns. We also
notice that the systematic component of risk increases after the financial crisis.
We finally verify that the fraction of systematic risk is not the same in different
industrial sectors. In particular, more “cyclical” and “systemic” factors, such as
Financials or Consumer discretionary, show a much larger impact of systematic
factor.
Possible directions for further research may be oriented to the inclusion of
additional factors in the proposed APT model for credit spreads. A promising
extension is also the modelization of credit spreads in a non-linear way, pos-
sibly including more sophisticated dependence structures than the simple one
proposed here.
Regarding the second topic, we extend the literature proposing a bivari-
ate state space model and verify that it actually improves the performances of
standard inversion techniques in explaining the observed credit spreads. The
improvement is particularly significant during the crisis period, characterized
by a larger noise contaminating the observed equity price and equity volatility.
This supports the ability of the state space model to remove the noise compo-
nent and to produce better estimates of the asset value of the company and,
consequently, more accurate predictions of spreads.
Further research in this direction may involve the extension of the proposed
state space model to include more than two state variables, such as interest rates
or dividend yields and verify their ability to explain observed credit spreads.
Furthermore, the investigation is here limited to structural models able to ex-
press the measurement function in closed-form. An interesting topic could be
the use of numeric techniques able to express the observed variables (such as
equity prices) as a more general function of state variables. This would allow
also the use of more sophisticated stochastic processes, such as long memory
processes, to describe the assets of a company.
In the last chapter we identify some explicit drivers for the noise postulated
128
in chapter 2. In particular, we verify that the errors produced by structural
credit risk models significantly depend on liquidity indicators and that their
explained variability is not negligible. We finally verify that the errors left by
both structural variables and liquidity indicators, are strongly correlated with
market-wide measures of limits of arbitrage and/or deleveraging pressures.
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